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




LETTER

OF
JAMES GARLAND,

TO HIS CONSTITUENTS.



The Presidential question, fellow-citizens, having assumed a decided aspect, and there being but two candidates before the American People, for their suffrages at the ensuing election, Martin Van Buren and William Henry Harrison, it becomes the duty of every citizen to choose between them. Having myself determined on the support of General Harrison, I feel it a duty which I owe to you, being your representative in Congress, to state the reasons on which that determination is founded.

When I supported Mr. Van Buren for the Presidency at the last election, I did so under the firm conviction that he would administer the Government according to the strictest and most rigid principles of the republican faith; arrest the systematic invasion of the rights of the States by federal authority; check the usurpations and encroachments of the Executive department; introduce the most rigid system of economy and simplicity into the expenditures and practices of the Government, and resist the enlargement of Executive power and patronage, by all the means in his power.—Mr. Van Buren's speeches and published opinions, although I did not concur with him in every thing, justified this opinion. In all this, fellow-citizens, I have been sadly deceived; and believing that his practices, since he ascended the Executive chair, have been at war with his previous professions, and that the system of policy and measures which he is now urging upon the country, will sap the foundations of our republican institutions, overthrow the liberty and destroy the prosperity of the country, and erect upon their ruins an inveterate and intolerable despotism, I feel it my duty to my country and to you to oppose his re-election.

I will now state the measures which Mr. Van Buren proposes, for the purpose of establishing that policy which I regard so dangerous and fatal in its consequences, and briefly assign the reasons upon which I found my objections to them. The first is

THE SUB-TREASURY SCHEME.

By this scheme it is proposed to place the ACTUAL and CONSTANT *custody* of the public moneys in the hands of *subordinate agents* of the Treasury, who by the Constitution will be *appointable* by the President, and *removable* at his will. That act of legislation which commits to the *custody* of these subordinate agents the public purse, indirectly, but effectually, places it within the power of the President; who will always have a *key*, in the constitutional power of removal, by which to unlock the strongest vault. No pains or penalties which can be imposed, or bond and security exacted, can resist this *constitutional* power of removal, and secure the public treasure against the grasp of an aspiring and ambitious Chief Magistrate. When it is remembered that the President, by the Constitution, is commander-in-chief of the army and navy—wields the *whole appointing* power, and is the *source* of all patronage, it cannot but be perceived that in addition to powers already fearful and dangerous, this system will *add another*—the *control* of the public purse—which will make the Executive, in its power and influence omnipotent. These, fellow-citizens, are no phantoms of my imagination; no inventions of my brain, to excuse or justify my abandonment of this Administration. They sprang from higher and more important sources! They sprang from the republicans of 1798-'99, and from an able and truly patriotic report made in 1826, from a committee of the Senate of the United States of which Mr. Van Buren himself was a member; directed against like principles and like dangers.

This scheme will not only place the virtual custody of the public money in the hands of the President, but will add to the already swollen number of the "*official horde*" a new *batch*, and add largely to the already immense and prodigal expenditures of the Government. The bill which the Executive committee of the House of Repre-

sentatives has reported, proposes to add four principal officers, and appropriates about \$40,000. The number of subordinate officers at the discretion of the four principals.— This will be the beginning, but what will be the end none can with certainty predict; but judging of the *future* by the *past*, I augur nothing preservative of our free institutions, or beneficial to the people. I have no doubt there will be a rapid accumulation of both.

In the address of the republican members of the Legislature of Virginia, which accompanied the immortal report of 1798. It is said:

“If *measures* can mould Governments, and if an *uncontrolled* power of construction, is surrendered to those who administer them, their progress may be easily foreseen, and their end easily foretold. A lover of monarchy, who opens the treasures of corruption, by distributing emolument among devoted partisans, may at the same time be approaching his object, and deluding the people with professions of republicanism. He may confound monarchy and republicanism by the art of definition. He may varnish over the dexterity which ambition never fails to display, with the pliancy, of language, the seduction of expediency, or the prejudices of the times. And he may come at length to avow, that so extensive a territory as that of the United States, can only be governed by the energies of monarchy; that it cannot be defended except by standing armies; and that it cannot be united, except by consolidation.”

The measures of the Administration of John Adams, which tended to these ends, and which aroused the jealous enthusiasm of the republicans of that day, to determined and vigorous resistance, consisted, as they stated,

“In *FISCAL SYSTEMS* and *ARRANGEMENTS*, which keep an host of commercial and wealthy individuals *embodied* and obedient to the *MANDATES* of the Treasury.

“In *ARMIES* and *NAVIES*, which will, on the one hand, enlist the tendency of man to pay homage to his fellow creature, who can feed or honor him; and, on the other, employ the principle of fear, by punishing imaginary insurrections, under the pretence of preventive justice.

“In the swarms of officers, civil and military, who can inculcate political tenets, tending to consolidation and monarchy, both by indulgencies and severities, and can act as spies over the free exercise of human reason.

“In restraining the freedom of the press, and investing the Executive with legislative, executive, and judicial powers, over a numerous body of men.

“And, that we may shorten the catalogue, in establishing, by successive precedents, such a mode of construing the constitution as will rapidly remove every restraint upon Federal power.”

If these objections against the Administration of John Adams, with its limited number of public officers, small amount of public expenditure, and proposed regular army were just, how much more strongly do they apply to the present Administration, with its swarm of office-holders, immense amount of expenditure, army, and proposed organization of an active militia force, general consolidating measures? If this state of things be maturely considered, we can in truth say, in the language of that address, “Let history be consulted; let the man of experience reflect; nay, let the *artificers of monarchy* be asked, what further materials they can need for building up their favorite system.”

In the report of Mr. Benton in 1826, from the committee on Executive Patronage, of which Mr. Van Buren was a member, the sources and influence of executive patronage are thus described:

“To be able to show to the Senate a full and perfect view of the power and workings of Federal patronage, the committee addressed a note, immediately after they were charged with this inquiry, to each of the Departments, and to the Postmaster General, requesting to be informed of the whole number of persons employed, and the whole amount of money paid out, under the direction of their respective Departments. The answers received are hereunto submitted, and made part of this report. With the Blue Book, they will discover enough to show that the predictions of those who were not blind to the defects of the constitution are ready to be realized; *that the power and influence of federal patronage, contrary to the argument in the 'Federalist,' is an overmatch for the power and influence of State patronage; that its workings will contaminate the purity of all elections, and enable the Federal Government, eventually to govern throughout the States, as effectually as if they were so many provinces of one vast empire.*”

Its concentration and effects in the hands of the President, are thus most admirably and accurately drawn:

“The whole of this great power will *centre* in the President. The King of England is the ‘fountain of honor;’ the President of the United States is the *source* of patronage. He presides over the entire system of federal appointments, jobs, and contracts. He has ‘power’ over support of the individuals who administer the system. He makes and unmakes them. He chooses from the circle of his friends and supporters, and may dismiss them, and upon all the principles of human actions will dismiss them, as often as they disappoint his expectations. His spirit will animate their actions in all the elections to State and federal offices. There may be exceptions; but the truth of a general rule is proved by the exception. The intended check and control of the Senate, without new constitutional or statutory provisions, will cease to operate. Patronage will penetrate this body, subdue its capacity of resistance, chain it to the car of power, and enable the President to rule as easily, and much more securely, with than without the nominal check of the Senate. If the President was himself the officer of the people, elected by them, and responsible to them, there would be less danger from this concentration of all power in his hands; but it is the business of statesmen to act upon things as they are, not as they would wish them to be.—We must then look forward to the time when the public revenue will be doubled; when the civil and military officers of the Federal Government will be quadrupled; when its influence over individuals will be multiplied to an indefinite extent; when the nomination of the President can carry any man through the Senate, and his recommendation can carry any measure through the two Houses of Congress; when the principle of public action will be open and avowed—the President wants my vote, and I want his patronage; I will vote as he wishes, and he will give me the office I wish for. What will this be but the government of one man? and what is the government of one man but a monarchy? Names are nothing. The nature of a thing is in its substance, and the name soon accommodates itself to the substance.”

In another part of this report it is said:

“The power of patronage, unless checked by the vigorous interposition of Congress, must go on *increasing*, until Federal influence in many parts of this confederation, will predominate in elections as completely as British influence predominates in rotten boroughs and towns, and in the great naval stations of Portsmouth and Plymouth. In no part of the practical operations of the Federal Government has the predictions of its ablest advocates been more completely falsified, than in this subject of patronage.”

Again: this report, for the purpose of showing what had been and what would be the increase of executive power and patronage, says:

“The patronage of the Federal Government, at the beginning, was founded upon a revenue of two millions of dollars. It is now operating upon twenty-two millions, and within the life time of many now living, must operate upon fifty. THE WHOLE REVENUE MUST, IN A FEW YEARS, BE WHOLLY APPLICABLE TO SUBJECTS OF PATRONAGE. At present, about one-half, say *ten millions* of it, are appropriated to the principal and interest of the public debt; which, from the nature of the object, involves but little patronage. In the course of a *few* years, this debt, without great mismanagement, must be paid off. A short period of peace, and a faithful application of the sinking fund, must speedily accomplish that most desirable object. Unless the revenue be then *reduced*, a *work as difficult* in REPUBLICS as in MONARCHIES, the patronage of the Federal Government, great as it already is, must, in the lapse of a few years, receive a *vast* accession of strength. The *revenue* itself will be DOUBLED, and instead of *one-half* being applicable to the objects of patronage, the *whole* will take *that* direction. Thus, the reduction of the public debt, and the increase of public revenue, will multiply in a *four-fold* degree, the *number* of persons in the service of the FEDERAL Government, the *quantity* of public money in their hands, and the *number* of objects to which it is applicable; *but as each person employed will have a circle of greater or less diameter*, of which he is the *centre* and the *soul*,—a circle composed of friends and relations, and individuals, employed by himself on public or on private account—THE ACTUAL INCREASE OF FEDERAL POWER AND PATRONAGE BY THE DUPLICATION OF THE REVENUE, WILL BE NOT IN THE ARITHMETICAL RATIO, BUT IN GEOMETRICAL PROGRESSION—AN INCREASE ALMOST BEYOND THE POWER OF THE MIND TO CALCULATE OR TO COMPREHEND.”

If these gentlemen were sincere in these expositions and sentiments, and that they

were, I do not doubt, what a fearful array of *present* and appalling picture of *future* danger from the swelling tide of executive power and patronage do they present.—These gentlemen then thought that there was no other way of avoiding the ruin of our institutions and the destruction of our liberties, than diminishing this immense mass of executive patronage. Hear them :

“In coming to the conclusion that Executive patronage ought to be DIMINISHED and REGULATED on the plan proposed, the committee rest their opinion on the ground that the exercise of great patronage in the hands of ONE MAN, has a constant tendency to *sully* the PURITY of our institutions, and to *endanger* the LIBERTIES of the country.”

Now, fellow-citizens, all the causes of danger and alarm which existed in 1826, are in full operation, and the predicted increase of officers and public revenue more than realized. And yet this republican President is proposing a scheme which not only adds a new batch of public officers, and a new item of expenditure to the present list, but which will place in his *actual* control the whole revenue of the nation. What more, can power desire, to do its works of ambition or oppression?

But, fellow-citizens, I will offer you further evidence of the enormity of this scheme, from its present advocates. When Mr. Leigh, in a public speech at Petersburg, in Virginia, in 1834, suggested, with the utmost accuracy, the outlines of this scheme. The “Globe” then, as now, the *Executive press* at Washington, broke out upon it in strains of the most rabid fury, and denounced it, not only as dangerous in the extreme, but unconstitutional. Just hear it:

“This is the notable plan by which Senator Leigh would *diminish* the power of the Executive over the depositories of public money! Instead of suffering the President to appoint *one* Treasurer, as he does now, he would have him ‘*appoint* as many as should be convenient.’ Or if the appointment were taken out of the hands of the President, with the concurrence of the Senators, it must be vested in the head of the Treasury Department, to be made without their concurrence. And when appointed, these officers must necessarily be, as all other Executive officers now are, subject to removal at the will of the President, Mr. Leigh attacks the Constitution itself, when he controverts these positions, as we shall hereafter show. And these Treasurers, all appointed by the President, and removable at his will, with all the public money in their *actual possession*—in their *pockets, desks, trunks, and vaults*—are, in the opinion of Mr. Leigh, the constitutional depositories of the public moneys, in preference to the *State banks*, which guard the public treasure as they do their own, *over which the President has no control*, and to one Treasurer, who instead of having the money in his *actual possession*, cannot possibly get a dollar of it into his hands, for any other purpose than to pay his own salary and ordinary office expenses. *It is fortunate for General Jackson that he does not entertain Mr. Leigh’s opinions.* If he had suggested such a system, what peals of patriotic indignation would have burst from eloquent Senators against the *usurper and tyrant*, who desired to get the millions of the Treasury into the *very hands* of his partisans and parasites!”

I do not quote the “Globe,” because there is any value in its authority, or respect due to its opinions; I quote it as the known organ of the Sub-treasury party, and as embodying their sentiments upon this subject. It was fortunate for General Jackson, quoth this veritable journal, in 1834, that he did not entertain Mr. Leigh’s opinions, for the very suggestion of such a system would have drawn upon him “*peals of patriotic indignation*” as a “*usurper and tyrant who desired to get the millions of the Treasury into the very hands of his partisans and parasites.*” But it is very fortunate for Mr. Van Buren that he does, in 1840, entertain these very opinions, and has not only suggested the “*system*” but pressed it with a pertinacity and a recklessness rarely equalled in the annals of the Government. Where are the “*peals of patriotic indignation*” which the suggestion of this scheme of *usurpation and tyranny* would have invoked upon the head of General Jackson? “*Presto quick,*” changed into *honeyed adulation and nursing lullabies* to Martin Van Buren. This, according to some of our modern “*Jim Crow*” political philosophers is *consistency!*

But, fellow-citizens, I will turn from the testimony of the “Executive press” at Washington, to the testimony of its primary satellite at Richmond, the “faithful Abdiel of the Enquirer”—he whose whole political career has been so remarkable for its purity, disinterestedness, fidelity, and consistency. What says this press about this notable scheme? In 1834, speaking of Mr. Leigh’s scheme, the editor said:

“As to the letter of Mr. Leigh it may satisfy his twenty-six friends; but it certainly does not satisfy us. The letter which they have called forth, should call forth, in its

turn, another letter to explain the true meaning of that passage which speaks of divorcing all connexion with banks, State or Federal. Do you mean (they might say) that the public money is to be left in the hands of the custom-house officers, responsible to the President and removal by him? If so, is Mr. Leigh prepared to incur the *irresistible objections* urged by the "Globe," and to increase in so *alarming* a degree the *patronage, power and influence* of the Executive?"

This is what Mr. Van Buren means; and this will be the inevitable effects of the adoption of his proposed scheme.

The editor of the "Enquirer" did not become passive as soon as the editor of the "Globe" took its position; and when he found such a large mass of the Democratic Republican party going in favor of this scheme, in his paper of the 8th of September, 1837, he pours out the following Jeremiad: "How is it that the great mass of the two parties seem to be respectively *shifting* the grounds they occupied in '34?" the *friends* of the Administration *violently assailed* it; most of the *Republicans*, with the *President* at their head, are inclined to support it. A better soldier than ourselves then gave forth the most serious objections to the scheme." Here the editor of the "Enquirer" makes a precious confession. He admits that the *Republicans* with the *President* at their head, have changed sides; and yet, with reckless effrontery, he charges as traitors and apostates all those Republicans who stood firm in their opposition, and refused to change with him; thus, too, in the teeth of his own weighty and impregnable objections.

In his paper of the 5th of September, 1837, the editor calls it a "*wild and dangerous scheme*, establishing two sorts of currency—the better for the officers of Government—the baser one for the People."

In his paper of the 20th October, 1837, he says, this "*notable scheme*" "*will enlarge the Executive power already too great for a republic.*"

I might multiply these extracts almost indefinitely, but these, with the endorsement that those which I have quoted from the Globe, are irresistible, are sufficient, in all conscience.

What, fellow-citizens, is the substance of these objections? Why, that this "*notable scheme*" will so *increase* the power, *enlarge* the patronage, and *extend* the influence of the Executive department, as to ride over all the other departments, overcome the rights of the States, sap the foundations of liberty, and rise into monarchy. Yes, these are the objections of the "Richmond Enquirer," and with these objections upon the lips of its editor, he is pursuing with fire and sword, the very men who, agreeing with him to the full extent of these objections, and unwilling to incur these dangers to their country, have adopted the only mode of successfully avoiding them—opposition to Mr. Van Buren's re-election. For such conduct, coming from such a source, faithful history will visit upon the head of its guilty author, that measure of scorn and indignation which such *treachery* to the safety and true interests of the country justly merits; and will single out, in a blaze of truth not to be obscured, who the "*real*" *apostate* is!

As a further and most conclusive proof of the unanimity with which these objections to this "*notable scheme*" were entertained by the Administration party, it is proper to remark, that when it was first proposed in the House of Representatives by my immediate predecessor, it was most rudely and unceremoniously strangled in its birth, and almost denied the rights of decent interment. Not a single member of the Administration party, save Colonel Beale of Virginia, dared to vote for it, nor did a single press, supporting the Administration, sustain it. The lightnings of their "*patriotic indignation*" flashed upon it in successive streams, and the thunders of their denunciation poured upon it in their loudest peals; and to all human appearance it was dead, dead, dead. Yet, strange to tell, by the magic power of that political "*galvanism*" which has been recently practised with so much skill and success, this very "*notable scheme*" has been resuscitated into life, animated with a *new* and a *purser* soul, and is rapidly rising into the vigor of manhood, not as the "*babe of Bethlehem*" to do good, but as the dragon of destruction to do mischief.

Now, fellow-citizens, whatever the banks may have done, however unworthy of confidence they may have rendered themselves, this does not diminish one single objection to the Sub-Treasury scheme. They remain unchanged and unaltered.

Another ground of objection to this notable scheme is, that it will endanger the safety of the public money. It would seem to me, fellow-citizens, that facts alone were suf-

ficient to sustain the truth of this objection. The amount of losses by individual and bank agency, stand thus:

Individual agency—by disbursing agents - - - - -	\$4,250,000
By collectors and receivers, to October, 1835 - - - - -	2,178,022
	\$6,438,022
By Banks, as depositories, about - - - - -	750,000

Excess of loss by individual over bank agency - - - - - \$5,678,022
 To this may be added about \$300,000 for individual defalcations since October, 1837, and deducted about \$700,000 collected or secured, leaving a net balance of \$5,278,022 in favor of bank depositories. These are the simple amounts as gathered from the Treasury reports, unfalsified and unsophisticated by the modern system of *magnifying* and *diminishing* arithmetical rhetoric.

In reference to this subject, I find in the last annual message of the President the following deceptive and delusive statement, into which he was evidently led by the one-sided report of the Secretary of the Treasury; not by a misstatement of fact, but by a suppression of fact—a suppression which leads to a false conclusion. The message says:

“The general results, (independent of the Post Office, which is kept separately, and will be stated by itself,) so far as they bear upon this subject, are, that the losses which have been and are likely to be sustained, by any class of agents, have been the greatest by banks, including, as required in the resolution, their depreciated paper received for public dues; that the next largest have been by disbursing officers, and the least by collectors and receivers.”

In opposition to this statement of the message, I place the following extract from the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, made in reference to this identical question in 1834. It is:

“It is gratifying to reflect, however, that the credit given by the Government, whether to BANK PAPER OR BANK AGENTS, has been accompanied by SMALLER LOSSES in the experience under the system of State banks, in this country at their WORST PERIODS and under their SEVEREST CALAMITIES, than ANY OTHER KIND OF CREDIT the Government has ever given in relation to its pecuniary transactions. Hence, unless the States and the United States should both deem it proper, gradually, and in the end entirely, to dispense with the paper system, and which event is *not anticipated*, the Government cannot escape occasional losses from that quarter, and can never hope to escape all losses from banks as fiscal agents, except by the employment in their place of other and individual agents, who will probably be found *less responsible, safe, convenient, and economical*.”

And, as a most conclusive and triumphant refutation of it, I quote the following extract of a letter from General Jackson to William J. Duane, late Secretary of the Treasury, dated Boston, June 26, 1833:

“It is unjust to the State banks” (says he) “to attribute to them the embarrassments of the Government and country, which led to the *suspension* of specie payments, and a depreciated paper currency; all those evils are attributable to other causes.

“In consequence of combinations among men of wealth, opposed to the war, the requisite loans of money could not be procured—disasters overtook our arms, for the want of necessary supplies of funds; and others were threatened. If patriotism ever actuated banks, it was felt in the operations of many of the local banks at that gloomy period. At the *hazard* of their *existence*, they furnished the means of *raising armies* and maintaining them in the field; and it was in their efforts to sustain the Government that they so far crippled themselves as to be obliged to suspend the payment of specie. If the Bank of the United States had then existed, it must have done as the State banks did, or it would have effected nothing in support of the Government. If it had not joined the combination against the Government, it could not have furnished the funds which the exigencies of the country required, without suspending the payment of specie. Instead of hostility and persecution, the Government owed the State banks gratitude and support. Their credit during the whole war was as good as its own; and without their aid, the Treasury must have stopped payment.”

I might further quote from this celebrated correspondence, but it is unnecessary, as this of itself is sufficient to establish the truth of my assertion.

Now what is the whole case? Why, the Government being engaged in an arduous and bloody war with one of the most powerful nations on earth, had *no money* of its own, nor sufficient credit to obtain it. It tried Treasury notes; but they depreciated to so great an extent that they had become unavailable. In this extremity the Banks rushed to the aid of the Government, and so expanded their issues as to compel them to resort to a suspension. With this suspension hanging over them like a mass of dense clouds, their notes were worth more, and were more available to the Government than its own notes. In proof of this I cite the following testimony of James Monroe, late President of the United States:

“I well remember, however, that when I was called by the President to the Department of War, on the 31st of August, 1814, the certificates of the Treasury were selling at \$80 in the \$100, by which \$20 were lost. It was evident that if a reliance was placed on the sale of the certificates only, a still further decline would ensue, and that the worst consequences might be apprehended. The country was invaded through the whole inland and maritime frontiers, and powerful squadrons were at the mouth of every bay and river leading to our principal cities, which were threatened with attack and ruin. The Metropolis of our Union had been forced, and our public buildings destroyed. Such was the State of the country and the funds, when I entered the Department of War. Under such circumstances an appeal was made to the patriotism and interest of the cities, and the Banks within them, by the Department of War, with the sanction of the President, for *loans of money*, necessary for their own defence, for that of the maritime frontier, and the Union. For the first loan that was obtained, one million of dollars from the City of New York, which took place in a few days after I entered the Department, no price was fixed. As Treasury notes were selling for \$80 in the \$100, that was claimed, but not acceded to. It was left for subsequent adjustment to be settled on fair principles. Several millions of dollars were obtained from the District of Columbia, and principal cities throughout the Union, and, according to my recollection, at par.”

Thus, that which is now seized hold of to charge as a loss to the Government, by the use of depreciated bank notes, was in reality a saving; because if the Government had used its own notes, they were more depreciated and less availing than bank notes. Why is it that the accurate investigation and lynxeyed sagacity of the Secretary of the Treasury did not discover this immense and notable loss to the Government by the use of *depreciated* bank paper, when he made his celebrated report in 1834, when the whole truth was important? Why is it that he could then ascribe this bank depreciation to the calamities of *war*, but now, by innuendo at least, to the curses of the banking system? The object to be effected now is the *reverse* of what it was *then*. That's all.

The loss of \$750,000 which I have stated, accrued to the Government from bank depositories, arose entirely from those failures which were produced by the operations of the war, and the exertions of the banks to aid the Government. Since that time, not one dollar has been lost. Of the \$28,000,000 on deposit in the banks in 1837, every cent has been paid but \$805,000; and that is well secured. What becomes, then, of all the predictions of immense losses to the Government by the insolvency of the banks?—all vanished into thin air—all falsified.

The reliance upon fine and imprisonment, and bond, and security, for the safety of the public money in the hands of individual agents, is too uncertain to be trusted. Human nature is so frail, and the seductions of temptation so strong, that I have no faith in these means of security. We have had too many melancholy proofs of their insufficiency immediately under our own eyes, and I have no wish to see them multiplied. I agree in sentiment with the judge of whom the poet says:

“He sent the thief who stole the gold away,
And punished him who put it in his way.”

I believe the Government is only adding to the cause of demoralization which now so extensively prevails in the country, by opening so many new sources of temptation to poor frail human nature, as this system will do. I believe that demoralization and defalcation will only be increased, and that what has been the history of the past, will only be confirmed by that of the future.

The advocates of the Sub-Treasury scheme, for the purpose of exciting public prejudices against the banking institutions of the country, and through that instrumentality, securing the adoption of their *pet* scheme, have uniformly ascribed the severe revulsion which overtook the country, in 1837, to the overaction of the banks. A few simple facts will falsify this charge. Gen. Jackson was inaugurated 4th of March, 1829. On the 1st of January, 1830, there were 330 State banks with a capital of \$145,192,208, and a circulation of \$61,323,808. In 1832, General Jackson vetoed the Bank of the United States, and earnestly recommended the use of the State banks as fiscal agents. The policy of Gen. Jackson was to use the State Banks as auxiliaries in his operations against the Bank of the United States; and in September, 1833, he withdrew the deposits from that institution, and employed the State banks as public depositories. He also, for the purpose of avoiding the distress which the withdrawal of the circulation of that bank would produce, and the speedy collections of its loans, urged upon the State banks to expand their circulation. On the 1st of January, 1835, under the influence of this policy, the number of State banks had increased to 558, with a capital of \$331,250,337, and a circulation of \$103,692,495. Through the years 1835 and 1836, this system was in the full tide of successful experiment; and accordingly we find that on the first of January, 1837, the number of banks had increased to 709, with a capital of \$410,195,710, and a circulation of \$149,185,590. The increase of banks, banking capital, and banking circulation, during General Jackson's administration, certainly grew out of the policy of the Government in relation to the Bank of the United States. It was greatly stimulated, too, by the rapid increase of surplus revenue during the years 1834-'35-'36, which on the first of January, 1837, amounted to the enormous sum of \$12,000,000, which the banks were authorized to discount upon, under the flattering prospect that it would not be speedily called for; the prices of our staple commodities, about this time, particularly cotton, which constitutes the larger portion of domestic exports, began to rise, and gave a new impulse to the spirit of speculation, and enterprise which acted and re-acted upon the banks and speculation, until all overacted themselves, and produced the revulsion which followed. That revulsion so disastrous to the commerce and agriculture of the country, swept over all interests, and seriously affected the banks. The overtrade in foreign productions left an immense foreign debt hanging over us; and the rapid and immense fall in the prices of cotton and other productions, rendered a resort to some other resource for payment necessary. This resource was specie. This heavy foreign demand for specie, the deposite act of 1836 distributing the \$40,000,000 of surplus revenue divided among the States, its injudicious execution, the embarrassments of the country, and the alarm of depositors, produced a sudden rush upon the banks for specie, which left them no alternative but to suspend or add hopeless ruin to the embarrassments which had overtaken the people and themselves. They wisely resolved upon suspension, for which the Government changed its policy, withdrew its confidence, and thereby added to the protraction of the suspension, and increased the prevailing embarrassments. In 1838, specie payments were generally but prematurely resumed. In 1839, growing out of this premature resumption, aided by the injudicious speculation of the Bank of the United States, in the great staple of the country, and its consequent losses a partial suspension took place. Of the 959 banks in the United States, in 1839, 313 suspended entirely since: 62 suspended in part: 495 continued payments in specie, and 56 broke or discontinued. Of those that suspended, 48 have resumed, and the balance will resume, I have no doubt, in the course of this year, unless the policy of the Government prevents it. When we consider the extent of the revulsion, the immense losses which have been sustained, it is matter of surprise that all but 56 of these numerous institutions have weathered the storm, and will be so promptly ready to resume their business. Of the suspension of 1839, the President thus speaks in his late message:

A large and highly respectable portion of our banking institutions are, it affords me unfeigned pleasure to state, exempted from all blame on account of this second delinquency. They have, to their great credit, not only continued to meet their engagements, but have even repudiated the grounds of suspension now resorted to. It is only by such a course that the confidence and good will of the community can be preserved, and, in the sequel, the best interests of the institutions themselves promoted."

Another, and to my mind irresistible, argument against this notable scheme is, that it restricts the receipts of the public revenue to "gold and silver *only*." I regard this as not only impracticable, but not desirable, and that it would, in its effects, curtail our expanded and expanding commerce; reduce the demand for, and consequently the value of, our domestic productions; reduce the demand for, and consequently the price

of, labor; and reduce, to an enormous and ruinous extent, the value of property. The prices of produce are always regulated by the foreign market and foreign demand; and the value of property very much by the quantity of circulating medium. The present estimated amount of specie in the country, is about \$65,000,000; an amount totally inadequate to all the purposes of our foreign and immense domestic trade. How is this amount to be increased to the demands of trade and business? Can it be done from the mints? These costly establishments add but about *two and a half* millions a year to the specie circulation, and most of that is consumed in plate and other articles. Their increase will not keep pace with the annual increase of our regular trade. Will it be supplied from foreign countries? If it is, we must reverse our whole system, by exporting more and importing less; which to an extent necessary, as the advantages of trade between nations, like individuals, must be reciprocal, may hazard nearly our whole foreign trade. I will test the probabilities of this foreign supply, by that standard which is most favorable to my opponents. I take the imports and exports of gold and silver for the years 1832-'33-'34-, '35-'36-'37 and '38. In these seven years, the *imports* of gold and silver were \$85,685,363, and the exports but \$30,631,205, leaving an excess of *imports over exports* of \$55,685,150. How has this benefited the country? During the same *seven years*, the imports of merchandise exceeded the exports \$117,380,212, and thus this excess of importation of specie over the exportation, added to the excess of importation, has saddled the country with a foreign debt of \$172,434,369, which is to be paid. This, under the ordinary state of trade, must even strip us of our specie: during the year 1839, \$9,000,000 of stock was exported. From 1821 to 1831, inclusive, when the currency and trade of the country was much more regular and steady, the exports of specie exceeded the imports \$3,497,001. Yet the condition of all classes of the country was generally more prosperous. If this be the result of increasing the specie circulation of the country by foreign importation, no man in his senses would desire to see it continued; for ultimately it would overwhelm us. The only alternative, then, for the exclusive gold and silver system, is to reduce trade, labor, and commerce to the present specie standard, and the slow operation of the mints. Such a system may work well for the Shylocks of the day, by building up American Rothschilds and Barings, but will work ruin to the property-holding and debtor class.

It has been urged by the authors of the Sub-treasury scheme, that its operation is to be confined solely to the keeping safely of the public money, and that the Federal Government, as it has no power over the business and commerce of the country, should pay no regard to its influence, good or bad, upon these; but when the scheme is presented to the people's acceptance, we find it uniformly accompanied with recommendations of its salutary influence upon the trade of the country; and thus we have the admission, indirectly, that the management of the public revenue, is to be made subservient to the uses of trade, and the preservation of a good currency. It is contended by those in high power, that this scheme, by reducing the amount of banking, will have a tendency to bring us near a metallic currency; which last, it is said, if in use would prevent speculation and restrain credit. If this hypothesis were true, then it would follow, that failures in business, and fluctuations in prices, never occurred in countries, where the currency was purely metallic. Is this made good by history? So far from it, that the most ruinous fluctuations in prices have occurred in times and places, where paper currency was unknown. Take, for example, the following, from "Jacob's Inquiry into the production and consumption of the precious metals." In England, in the 12th century, the price of wheat varied from 2s. a quarter (money of that time) to 18s. and 8d. In the 13th century it varied from 1s. and 6d.; in 1213, to £1 4s.; in 1257, 1258, it rose to £2; in 1270 it rose to £4 16s.; and sometimes sold at £6 8s.; in 1288 it fell to 1s. and 6d.; in 1317 it sold at £2 4s. before harvest, and immediately after harvest 14s. In those days there were neither banks nor bankers in England, except the persecuted Jews, who were merely lenders of coin. And now let us see whether failures in trade, arising from stimulated credit, are prevented by metallic currency. There is a well known example in the city of Hamburg, which, for three years about the close of the last century, owing to the conquests of Napoleon, enjoyed a great monopoly in the importation of British and American commodities for the consumption of the German States and other countries in that quarter of the world. The stimulus given to business in that city during the period stated above, in the space of three years, raised prices to such a height, and so facilitated *credit*, that in the space of three months, in the year 1799, eighty houses in that city failed for an aggregate sum of \$12,000,000. This instance, so frequently quoted, that it has ob-

tained the character of universally accredited history, occurred in a country where no other than metallic currency was known, and is an eminent example of the truth, that credit and indiscreet speculation are not exclusively the offspring of banks and paper money. Instances parallel with those I have quoted, and tending to the same point in this question, abound in the history of former times, and even in recent days, in countries where neither banks nor bank paper exist; but the limits of this address do not admit of further comment on the subject.

It has been often asserted that this Sub-treasury scheme contains the germ of a great national bank, which will, in time, be the sole depository of the coin, and the maker of all the bank paper, which is to constitute the currency of the country; and this, it is not difficult to see, will, in a certain contingency, spring up under the all-controlling law of stern necessity. The demand for coin, it is said, to supply this scheme, will in good times, not exceed, at any given period, more than \$5,000,000, although the amount of revenue paid in coin, in the course of any given year, will be equal to about \$20,000,000. The first sum, it is said, will be the maximum withdrawn from circulation constantly, as the disbursement of the revenue will, in prosperous times, when the banks are in good credit, find its way again to their vaults. It will be seen at once that this cannot be the case in times of commercial distress, when a demand for coin, to pay foreign debts, is draining the banks, and thus diminishing their credit. When this last case occurs, as it must frequently, owing to the unstable prices in Europe of cotton, (the great export of the United States,) then the money disbursed by the Government will be hoarded by individuals, and never reach the vaults of the banks; and hence, in a time of such pressure, we may safely calculate that the banks must sustain an abstraction from their coin, in a single year, of \$20,000,000, which will be hoarded and withdrawn from business; and this through the agency of the Treasury alone. To what result this will conduct us it is easy to see. The banks thus oppressed and scourged by the action of the Government, and the foreign demand for coin, will, in the end, find the employment of capital in banking unprofitable, and close their business. The foreign demand for coin, at such a crisis, will drain the country of the precious metals, and then will come that intense suffering of the people which, in this as in every other country, looks only to relief from oppression too intolerable to be borne: then the wild cry of a whole people will come up to this Government for relief; then the State banks will no longer exist, and much of the coin of the country will have gone abroad to pay a foreign debt, and what remains will be held by the Government; then the Federal Government will be required to use the specie in the safes of its Treasury as a basis for a currency in paper, based on the people's taxes; bankrupt citizens will implore, and the paralyzed enterprise of the country will uplift its trembling hands and ask for mercy; and then will the Sub-treasury stalk forward with its hundred arms outspread, and all its machinery ready. Then give but the power to emit *Treasury bank notes* and you will have a currency unlimited in its amount, as, for a time, it will be in credit. From that moment, (how near to, or remote from us, a merciful God only knows,) from that fated moment, the North American Republic ceases to be. The occupant of the Executive chair is then no longer the President known to the Constitution: he is from thence forward seated on an imperial throne, covered over with dictatorial power; the rights of the States, with their powers, are driven before the breath of his nostrils, like withered leaves before the blast of the tempest; and instead of a proud nation of freemen, strong in the possession of their liberties, under a Government of limited powers, a consolidated empire of slaves, will kneel at the footstool of a despot, begging from him, as a *boon*, that liberty which our fathers, at the price of blood, bequeathed to us as an unalienable right.

I have shrewdly suspected that our present Chief Magistrate was favorable to an executive bank. In President Jackson's second annual message, I find the following suggestions of such a system:

"It is thought practicable to organize such a bank, with the necessary offices, as a branch of the Treasury Department, based on the public and individual deposits, without power to make loans or purchase property, which shall remit the funds of the Government, and the *expense* of which may be paid, if thought advisable, by allowing its officers to *SELL* bills of exchange to *private* individuals at a *moderate premium*."

In his third annual message I find the same suggestion, with an indication of some of its principal features. It is as follows:

"That a bank of the United States, competent to all the duties which may be re-

quired by the Government, might be so organized as not to infringe on our own delegated powers, or the reserved rights of the States, I do not entertain a doubt. Had the Executive been called upon to furnish such an institution, the duty would have been cheerfully performed."

These suggestions of General Jackson were made when Mr. Van Buren was a member of the Cabinet, and, it is said, were approved by him. This was what was called an Executive bank in General Jackson's administration. In Mr. Van Buren's first annual message, I find the following kindred suggestion :

"In transferring its funds from place to place, the Government is on the same footing with a private citizen, and may resort to the same legal means. It may do so through the *medium* of bills drawn by itself, or purchased from others; and in these operations it may, in a manner undoubtedly constitutional and legitimate, facilitate and assist exchanges of individuals founded on real transactions of trade. The extent to which this may be done, and the best means of effecting it, are entitled to the fullest consideration."

Now, if buying and selling bills of exchange be a banking operation, then did these suggestions of General Jackson and Mr. Van Buren amount to the recommendation of an Executive bank; and that such an operation is banking, and a most profitable one too, none who are familiar with the subject can doubt. These are the grounds of my suspicion that Mr. Van Buren is favorable to such a one; and that such will be the result, I have no doubt, if the Administration succeed in fastening its financial schemes upon the country.

The second objection which I take to the policy of Mr. Van Buren, is his recommendation of the establishment of a bankrupt law over "*State corporations.*" This system, if adopted, will create another batch of *salariel* public officers, as commissioners of bankruptcy, to be located in all the prominent banking States, armed with authority, by federal power, to enter any bank, which, by force of the revulsions of trade, accident, or other necessity, may decline to redeem its notes in specie, take possession of all its assets and disburse them in that mode which shall be prescribed by act of Congress, regardless of the authority of the State by which they were created, or the provisions of its charter. That act which should benefit the State, and which the interests of the people might require would subject these institutions to the operation of this bankrupt law, regardless of the wishes of the States or the interests of the people. Virginia, in one way or other, has about \$3,000,000 of stock in her banks, which, under this system, would be administered by *federal authority*, and upon principles of federal law. Will she submit to this, or will she assert her own rights, administer her own funds, and manage her own institutions, in her own way? I conceive that this scheme, if adopted, would be one of the grossest violations of the Constitution, and daring invasions of the rights of the States, which has been attempted since the foundation of this Government—the alien and sedition laws not excepted; and only equalled in enormity by the proposed militia organization of the present session. What were the opinions of Mr. Van Buren upon this subject formerly. In 1827, in a speech in the Senate of the United States, upon this identical question, he said :

"He did not think that any great difficulty existed in this question; to him the matter was clear; but his impressions had been opposed by several Senators, and he would protract the debate but a moment to give, very briefly, his views of the matter. It certainly appeared to him, that one moment's reflection would decide gentlemen against the amendment proposed by his friend from South Carolina. It had been said, formerly, and on various occasions, that the States had no right to grant bank charters, and that the banking privilege belonged exclusively to the Federal Government. No direct attempt, however, had hitherto been made to deprive the States of that power which they had long exercised unmolested. *But now the attempt was to be made, if not in an open and unequivocal manner, at least, in an indirect way, to strip the States of the power of chartering banks.* At any rate, if it were contended that this provision did not go so far, it could not be denied that it interfered in the regulation which State Governments might have adopted for the government of those institutions, which was an *odious exercise of power not granted by the Constitution.*— This amendment has this extent: It directs the States as to the manner in which they shall exercise their sovereignty in this particular, points out what penalty shall be inflicted in case the charters granted by the States are violated. In fact, it points out

what the privileges granted to the incorporations shall be, by dictating the forfeiture, and directing what the companies may and what they may not do. All this has hitherto been done by the States. They have assumed the direction of these matters as a right, which they doubtless have. And in including this subject of corporations in the bill now before the Senate, it will be taken entirely from the States and subjected to the power of the bankrupt system. This was never done, and never attempted in any country on the face of the globe. In England, such a provision was never dreamed of, nor did he believe that, when the Constitution was framed, such an attribute was imagined by those who authorized the establishment of a bankrupt system. He did not accede to the opinion, that the system had power over all chartered institutions. *By the very nature of their association, they were, in some respects, exempted from its operation, and no such power was ever contemplated, or was, at this moment, under the most extended construction, enjoyed by the General Government.*"

How is it, that, Mr. Van Buren should when President, so radically change his views upon this important subject? Is it that it would be a thunderbolt in the hands of the Executive power, which, when hurled, would lay low every bank, which the Sub-Treasury could not destroy, or the smiles of patronage win to its embraces? It would be a most admirable auxiliary to the Sub-Treasury scheme, and would do the work of destruction most effectively. Will any disciple of the "Jim Crow" school of political philosophy, undertake to deny that upon this question, Mr. Van Buren's opinions have *changed*; ay, fellow-citizens, most vitally and dangerously changed?

This project, *like the Sub-Treasury*, had many opponents when it was first proposed; but like that, it is assuming a *party hue*, and like that will be ultimately carried, if this Administration be not broken down, by a *party* vote for the benefit of *party*. Recently two distinguished Senators, and leading friends of the Administration (Mr. Benton and Mr. Buchanan) have avowed their advocacy of it; the press defends it; and if the "*Sub-Treasury*" is adopted, this will follow in its wake. I am opposed, fellow-citizens, to all bankrupt laws, on account of the distinction it makes between the merchant and the farmer and mechanic, and the injustice of cancelling a just debt *by law* against the consent of the creditor; but I am more particularly opposed to this scheme, which would invade the power and oust the jurisdiction of the States over their own institutions.

The *third* objection which I take to Mr. Van Buren's policy is the authority which he claims, that the Executive should be left at liberty to use banks or not, in the management of the financial operations of the government, at its discretion. I find the following sentiment in his message of the 3d day of December, 1838:

"Like other State establishments they may be *used* or *not*, in conducting the affairs of the Government, as *public policy* and the general interest of the Union may seem to require."

This authority would leave the Executive invested with a discretion that would enable it, with the influence of its patronage, to draw into its embraces, and subject to its policy, the soundest and most efficient banks of the community. Through this instrumentality, the Executive would address the most susceptible of all passions, self-interest. Without any argument on my part, I put in contrast with this view of Mr. Van Buren, those of General Jackson upon the same subject, by which it will be seen how diametrically opposite are the views of the "successor" and the predecessor. In Gen. Jackson's message of December, 1834, he said:

"IN THE REGULATIONS WHICH CONGRESS MAY PRESCRIBE RESPECTING THE CUSTODY OF THE PUBLIC MONEY, IT IS DESIRABLE THAT AS LITTLE DISCRETION AS MAY BE DEEMED CONSISTENT WITH THEIR SAFE KEEPING, SHOULD BE GIVEN TO EXECUTIVE AGENTS. No one can be more deeply impressed than I am with the soundness of the doctrine which restrains and limits, by specific provisions, *Executive discretion*, as far as it can be done consistently with the preservation of its constitutional character. *In respect to the control over the public money, this doctrine is peculiarly applicable.*"—*General Jackson's Message, December, 1835.*

Again he says upon this subject:

"The duty of the Legislature to define by CLEAR and POSITIVE enactment, the NATURE and EXTENT of the action which it belongs to the Executive to superintend, springs out of a policy analagous to that which enjoins upon all the branches of the Federal Government an abstinence from the exercise of powers not clearly granted."

In his cabinet manifesto of the 18th of September, 1833, he said:

“In ridding the country of an irresponsible power which has attempted to control the Government, care must be taken not to unite the same power to the Executive branch. To give a President control over the currency, and power over individuals now possessed by the Bank of the United States, even with the material difference that he is responsible to the people, would be as objectionable and dangerous as to leave it as it is. Neither the one nor the other is necessary, and therefore ought not to be resorted to.”

And again:

“The attention of Congress is earnestly invited to the regulation of the deposits in the State banks, by law. Although the power now exercised by the Executive department in this behalf, is only such as was uniformly exerted through every Administration from the origin of the government up to the establishment of the present bank, yet it is one which is susceptible of regulation by law, and therefore ought so to be regulated. The power of Congress to direct in *what places* the Treasurer shall keep the public moneys of the Treasury, and to impose *restrictions* upon the Executive authority, in relation to their *custody and removal*, is *unlimited* and *its exercise* will rather be courted than discouraged by those public officers and agents on whom rests the responsibility for their safety. It is desirable that as little power as possible should be left to the President or Secretary of the Treasury over those institutions: *which being thus freed from Executive influence, and without a common head to direct their operations, would have neither the temptation nor the ability to interfere in the political conflicts of the country. Not deriving their characters from the national authorities, they would never have those inducements to meddle in general elections, which have led the Bank of the United States to agitate and convulse the country for upwards of two years.*”

General Jackson sought to *tie up* the hands of the Executive *by law*, Mr. Van Buren to keep them *loose and unshackled*. The Sub-Treasury friends of the Administration see imminent danger to the purity of the Government and the safety of the people, in regulating the deposits of the public money in banks *by law*, but they see none in leaving the Executive *at discretion* upon this subject, and giving them the Sub-Treasury as a sapper and miner, to undermine, and the bankrupt law as a battering ram to break them down. The discretion of this active, restless, and aspiring department of the Government, is much more safe in their estimation than “*law*”!!! Combine this with the other powers now in, and proposed to be placed in the hands of the Executive, and how formidable and dangerous it will be none can be so blind as not to see.

The *fourth and not least formidable* exception which I take to Mr. Van Buren’s administration, is the following recommendation of the Secretary of War, for what he is pleased to call the organization of the militia:

“It is proposed to divide the United States into eight military districts, and to organize the militia in each district, so as to have a body of *twelve thousand five hundred men* in active service, and another of equal number as a RESERVE. This would give an ARMED militia force of *two hundred thousand men*, so drilled and stationed, as to be ready to take their places in the ranks, in defence of the country, whenever called upon to oppose the enemy or repel the invader. The age of the RECRUIT to be from *twenty to thirty-seven*. The whole term of service to be eight years; *four years* in the *first class*, and *four* in the *reserve*. One fourth part, twenty-five thousand men, to leave the service every year, passing, at the conclusion of the first term, into the reserve, and exempted from *ordinary militia duty* altogether, at the end of the second. In this manner twenty-five thousand men will be discharged from militia duty every year, and twenty-five thousand FRESH RECRUITS will be received into the service. It will be sufficient for all useful purposes, that the remainder of the militia, under certain regulations provided for their government, be enrolled, and be mustered at long and stated intervals; for in due process of time, nearly the whole mass of the militia will pass through the first and second classes, and be either members of the ACTIVE corps or of the reserve, or counted among the exempts, who will be liable to be called upon only in periods of invasion or imminent peril. The manner of enrollment, the number of days of service, and the rate of compensation, ought to be fixed by law; but the details had better be left subject to regulation; a plan of which I am prepared to submit to you.”

Upon this recommendation the President says:

“The present condition of the defences of our principal seaports and navy yards, as

represented by the accompanying report of the Secretary of War, calls for the *early* and *serious* attention of Congress; and as connecting itself intimately with this subject, *I cannot recommend* TOO STRONGLY to your consideration, the *plan* submitted by that officer, for the organization of the militia of the United States."

I do not hesitate to pronounce, fellow citizens, that if this recommendation be carried into execution, it will be a most flagrant violation of the Constitution, open invasion of State power, and constitute a most dangerous military force to the liberties of the people.

There are only three causes for which the militia can be called out under federal authority: "*To execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.*" These are the express words of the constitution, and admit of no doubtful interpretation. The States never intended to place their militia under the authority of the General Government, except to meet these emergencies. This is manifest from the following clause of the 8th section of the 1st article of the Constitution, Congress shall have power "*to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the UNITED STATES, RESERVING to the STATES, respectively the APPOINTMENT of the officers, and the authority of TRAINING the militia, according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.*" The power of training the militia, is by this article reserved to the States, and therefore, prohibited to the Federal Government; and the only causes for which the militia can be employed in the service of the United States, are those which I have enumerated—to *execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.* Can the Secretary of War find in either of these clauses of the Constitution, any warrant for this most extraordinary recommendation? Most certainly he cannot. Let us analyze it, and the deformity of its features will be most prominently exposed. In the first place, the 26 States of this confederation are to be divided into eight military districts; so that an average of more than three States will be embraced in a military district. Between these districts there is to be "recruited," (I use the Secretary's own form of expression,) 200,000 men, for eight years, one-half in constant "active" service of the United States, and in its pay, and subject to its authority. For what object? avowedly to be trained. And thus the militia may be carried from one State to another within its military district, to do that by federal authority, "*trained,*" which the Constitution expressly prohibits. Am I mistaken in this? In addition to the plain language, and palpable purpose of the report, I turn to the 17th section of the detailed report of the Secretary of War, of the 20th of March, 1840. It provides:

"*That the president of the United States be authorized to call forth and assemble such numbers of the ACTIVE force of the militia, at such places within their respective districts, and at such times, not exceeding twice, nor — days in the same year, as he may deem necessary; and during such period, including the time when going to, and returning from, the place of rendezvous, they shall be deemed in the service of the United States, and be subject to such regulations as the PRESIDENT may think proper to adopt for their instruction, discipline, and improvement in military discipline.*"

Now, fellow-citizens, take up the Constitution, reflect upon its provisions—the caution with which power over the militia was imparted to the Federal Government, and the strong restrictions placed upon that power; and ask yourselves what part of the Constitution justifies this provision.

This scheme proposes an inequality in the time of service—the arming, equipping and training the militia—which, independent of its unconstitutionality and danger, should stamp it with utter reprobation. These men are to serve but eight years, the ordinary militia on an average of twenty-five. These men are to have the advantages of strict discipline, the ordinary militia its present disorganized and chaotic state.—These men are to be paid for the time they are engaged in performing military duty, the ordinary militia to be unpaid. These men are to be kept constantly armed and equipped, the ordinary militia, I suppose, to have *cornstalks* and *sticks* in their hands, to learn the use of the fire-lock. I am sure the great body of the militia will never submit to these gross inequalities. The value of the militia system and the safety of the people demand that the whole militia force should be upon an equality—uniform in its discipline, arms, equipment and service.

This "*ELITE*" militia force, when organized, is to be placed under the command of the President, to be in the pay of the Government of the United States; and subjected to the temptations which honor, emolument, and military pride will throw in their way for eight years, and subjected to the rules and articles of war. Is there no

danger in this, fellow-citizens? If there is none, what would constitute danger? for these two hundred thousand men, under the command of the President, and in the pay of the Federal Government, would be just as much a regular force as if it had the name, and as liable to be seduced to the purposes of ambition. The more I see of the progress of this Government and its tendency to monarchy, the more I admire and approve of that jealousy of standing armies which our republican fathers so strongly manifested at the formation of the Constitution. Any mass of organized men, with arms in their hands, in the pay and subject to the authority of an aspiring ambitious chieftain, with the whole revenues of the nation in his hands, will be dangerous to liberty, and should be looked upon with the greatest apprehension.

From the most accurate estimate which I can make, this system would not add less than \$4,000,000 to the annual expenditures of the Government; which, taking into consideration the present heavy annual burden upon the people, is no inconsiderable objection to this wild, dangerous and unnecessary system.

There are other exceptions, fellow-citizens, which I take to the principles and policy of this Administration, which would, in themselves, be fruitful themes of commentary; such as the recommendation of an authority to invest surpluses of the revenue in the buying and selling of State stocks; regarded by all our Republican Presidents as prolific sources of corruption. The graduation of the prices of the public lands which would, in effect, surrender the public lands to the new States; a scheme to which Mr. Van Buren while a member of the Senate, was decidedly opposed, and the extraordinary pretension of the President that the Executive is a component part of the Legislature, on which I might enlarge, but I forbear; those which I have specifically enumerated are in themselves sufficient for my purpose.

For a true picture of the extraordinary powers which the schemes which I have enumerated would confer on the Executive department, their influence upon the destiny of our country, and dangerous effects upon our free institutions, I quote from Mr. Benton's and Mr. Van Buren's report of 1826, to which I have before referred. The concluding paragraph of that admirable document says:

"The committee must then take things as they are. Not being able to lay the axe to the root of the tree; they must go to *pruning* among the *limbs* and *branches*. Not being able to reform the Constitution in the election of President, they must go to work upon his powers, and trim down these by statutory enactments, wherever it can be done by law, and with a just regard to the proper efficiency of the Government.—For this purpose, they have reported the six bills which have been enumerated. *They do not pretend to have exhausted the subject*, but only to have seized a few of its prominent points. They have only touched in four places, the vast and pervading system of *Federal Executive patronage*—THE PRESS, THE POST OFFICE, THE ARMED FORCE, and the APPOINTING POWER. They are few, compared to the whole number of points which the system presents; but they are points *vital to the liberties* of the country. The Press is put foremost, because it is the *moving power* of human action; the Post Office is the *handmaid* of the press: the *armed force* ITS EXECUTOR, and the *appointing* power the *directress* of the whole. If the appointing power was itself an emanation of the popular will; if the President was himself the officer and the organ of the people; there would be *less* danger in leaving to his *will* the *sole direction* of all these *arbiters* of human fate. *But things must be taken as they are*; statesmen must act for the *country* they live in, and not for the *Island of Utopia*; they must act upon the state of facts in that country, and not upon the visions of fancy. In the country for which the committee act, the press, (with some exceptions,) the Post Office, the armed force, and the appointing power, are *in the hands of the President*, and the President himself *is not in the hands of the people*. The President *may*, and in the current of human affairs, *will be, against* the people; and *in his hands*, the *arbiters* of human fate must be *against them* also. This will not do. *The possibility of it must be avoided*. The *safety* of the people is the '*supreme law*,' and to ensure that safety, these arbiters of human fate must *change position*, and take post on the *side of the people*."

If this picture and these prophecies had been drawn with express reference to the existing state of things, could they, fellow-citizens, have better described them? The prophetic accuracy with which that distinguished patriot and statesman, Patrick Henry, saw the dangers of the Executive power, is to be found in the following extract from one of his speeches, in opposition to the adoption of the Constitution:

"Tell me when and where did freedom exist when the purse and the sword were

given up from the people? Unless a miracle in human affairs should interpose, no nation ever did or ever can retain its liberty after the loss of the sword and the purse.

"I object, too, against the immense patronage of the President, because it places in his hands the means of corruption, and distributes throughout the country a band of retainers in the shape of judges, revenue officers, and others, which render him irresistible in any scheme of ambition that he might meditate against the liberties of the country. * * * * * Gentlemen depend upon it, this power may work sorely on your necks."

That these measures, if acquiesced in, tend to break down the powers of the States, destroy their resources, and build up a great central power in the Federal Government, to be wielded by the will of *a single man*, is too obvious to need any argument to prove. In place of any reasoning or speculation of my own, I here subjoin an extract from the Republican Address of 1793, to which I have before referred, which applies with irresistible force. These venerated patriots say:

"The acquiescence of the States, under infractions of the Federal compact, would either beget a speedy consolidation, by precipitating the State Governments into impotency and contempt, or prepare the way for a revolution, by a repetition of these infractions, until the people are aroused to appear in the majesty of their strength. It is to avoid these calamities that we exhibit to the people the momentous question, whether the Constitution of the United States shall yield to a construction which defies every restraint and overwhelms the best hopes of republicanism."

"Exhortations to disregard domestic usurpations, until foreign dangers shall have past, is an artifice which may be forever used; *because the possessors of power, who are the advocates for its extension, can ever create national embarrassments, to be successively employed to soothe the people into sleep, whilst that power is SWELLING SILENTLY, SECRETLY, and FATALLY.* Of the same character are insinuations of a foreign influence, which seize upon a laudable enthusiasm against danger from abroad, and distort it by an unnatural application, so as to blind your eyes against danger at home."

I also subjoin the following extracts from Mr. Madison's immortal report of '99; a report which should be the text-book of every republican, which applies with as much, if not more, force to the measures of this Administration, upon which I have animadverted than those against which it was directed. It says:

"That the obvious tendency and inevitable result of a consolidation of the States into one sovereignty, would be to transform the republican system of the United States into a monarchy, is a point which seems to have been sufficiently decided by the general sentiment of America. In almost every instance of discussion relating to the consolidation in question, its certain tendency to pave the way to monarchy, seems not to have been contested. The prospect of such a consolidation has formed the only topic of controversy. It would be unnecessary, therefore, for the committee to dwell long on the reasons which support the position of the General Assembly. It may not be improper, however, to remark two consequences, evidently flowing from an extension of the federal power to every subject falling within the idea of the 'general welfare.'

"One consequence must be to enlarge the sphere of discretion allotted to the Executive Magistrate. Even within the legislative limits, properly defined by the Constitution, the difficulty of accommodating legal regulations to a country so great in extent, and so various in its circumstances, had been much felt, and has led to occasional investments of power in the Executive, which involve perhaps as large a portion of discretion as can be deemed consistent with the nature of the executive trust.

"In proportion as the objects of legislative care might be multiplied would the time allowed for each be diminished, and the difficulty of providing uniform and particular regulations for all be increased. *From these sources would necessarily ensue a greater latitude to the agency of that department which is always in existence, and which could best mould regulations of a general nature, so as to suit them to the diversity of particular situations.* And it is in this latitude, as a supplement to the deficiency of the laws, that the degree of executive prerogative materially consists."

These, fellow-citizens, are the grounds of my objection to the re-election of Mr. Van Buren, and which have determined me to oppose it by all fair and honorable means. You will perceive that all have arisen since his election, and during the progress of his Administration. They are founded on principles which I maintained, in

common with you, when I came into Congress—principles which I believe sound, and which I have not changed and will not change. I have, I admit, changed as to my support of Mr. Van Buren; but it is because he has changed his principles, and I cannot change with him.

If, for the reasons which I have assigned, I shall have justified myself in opposing the re-election of Mr. Van Buren, having heretofore supported him, the next question is, whether I can justify myself in supporting General Harrison, with the objections which I heretofore made to his election, and the advantage of principle or expediency, which I expect to be derived from his success? This I will answer.

The first objection to General Harrison is, that he was a federalist of the school of '98. This charge has no foundation but the naked assertion of John Randolph, made in the Senate of the United States, without a scrap of recorded history to sustain it. The charge was no sooner made than promptly repelled by General Harrison. His denial is sustained by the testimony of Judge Burnett, of Ohio, who has known General Harrison intimately all his life, and by the fact that Mr. Jefferson had great confidence in him, and, after his accession to the Presidency, appointed him to several offices of high importance and trust. There is no truth in the charge.

The second objection is that he is the friend of a protective tariff. That General Harrison was the friend of a protective tariff cannot be doubted, for his speeches in Congress, and votes upon the tariff prove that. But not only did Mr. Van Buren, but the present Vice President, and Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Benton, prominent friends of the administration, all did the same thing; and, so far as these opinions and these votes constitute an objection to General Harrison, they equally constitute an objection to Mr. Van Buren. To shield Mr. Van Buren from responsibility for these votes, the instruction of the New York Legislature to vote for the tariff of 1828 is relied upon. Was Mr. Van Buren instructed when he voted for the tariff of 1824? Does not his obedience to the instruction of 1828 prove his acknowledgment of the constitutional power of Congress? and does not his Albany speech in 1827, prove that he favored it on grounds of expediency? The mystery why Mr. Van Buren could vote *without instruction*, for the tariff of 1824, and required the *force* of instruction to vote for that of 1828, is perhaps to be found in the fact that, in 1824, he had not fixed his eyes upon the elevated height of the Presidential chair. But I need not detain you upon this subject. The compromise acts of 1832 and 1833 upon this vital question is the ground upon which Mr. Van Buren and his friends plant themselves; and this is the ground upon which General Harrison plants himself, as will be seen by the following letter, written in reply to a letter addressed to him by several of his political friends:

“ZANESVILLE, November 2, 1836.

“GENTLEMEN: I had the honor, this moment, to receive your communication of yesterday. I regret that my remarks of yesterday were misunderstood in relation to the tariff system. What I meant to convey was that I *had* been a warm advocate for that system upon its first adoption, that I still believed in the benefits it had conferred upon the country. But I certainly never had, nor never would have, any idea of reviving it. What I said was that I would not agree to the repeal as it *now stands*. In other words, I am for supporting the compromise act, and never will agree to its being altered or repealed.

“In relation to the internal improvement system, I refer you, for my sentiments, to my letter to the honorable Sherrod Williams.

“WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

“Messrs. DOSTER, TAYLOR, and others.”

It will be seen by the date of this letter that when I wrote the address to the people of Nelson, which has recently been recurred to by my opponents, as involving me in gross inconsistency, it had not been published, and I was ignorant of the fact that General Harrison had determined to abide the compromise act.

The third objection to General Harrison is, that he is the advocate of the constitutional power of Congress to construct roads and canals in the States. This is true; General Harrison's speeches and votes as a member of Congress prove the fact; and I freely admit that General Harrison voted more freely for appropriations of this sort than Mr. Van Buren did, who also is, to some extent, involved in this charge. But upon this question, also, Mr. Van Buren and General Harrison have quadrated their opinions to the same standard, as will be seen by reference to both of their letters to Sherrod Williams. Both think the Constitution should be amended, so as to impart the power to the Federal Government, with such restrictions as will produce equality in its administration. Both think these appropriations should be confined to works of

strictly national character. But, fellow-citizens, many of the most prominent friends of Mr. Van Buren's Administration advocated the same doctrines and gave the same votes upon this subject that General Harrison did. The Vice President, Mr. Benton, Mr. Buchanan, and many others—not to say Henry St. George Tucker, the president of the new fledged "Democratic Republican State rights party" central committee of Virginia. Mr. Benton voted for the bill appropriating money for the construction of the Maysville road, over General Jackson's celebrated veto. Upon this question, then, Mr. Van Buren and his friends are as obnoxious as General Harrison.

The fourth objection to General Harrison is, that he is friendly to the institution of a national bank. This is one of the charges which I made against General Harrison in 1836, but it seems without any just foundation. In 1832, in a letter to the "Cincinnati Inquisitor," he pronounced the late Bank of the United States unconstitutional. In his letter to Sherrod Williams he repeated this declaration, and nowhere and upon no occasion has he ever declared himself favorable to one. Being interrogated by Mr. Williams whether, if elected President, he would approve a bill chartering a national bank, he answers :

"I would, if it were clearly ascertained that the public interest, in relation to the collection and disbursement of the revenue would materially suffer without one, and there were unequivocal manifestations of public opinion in its favor. I think, however, the experiment should be fairly tried, to ascertain whether the financial operations cannot be as well carried on without the aid of a national bank. If it is not necessary for that purpose, it does not appear to me that one can be constitutionally chartered.—There is no construction which I can give the Constitution which would authorize it, on the ground of affording facilities to commerce."

From this extract, it is entirely manifest that General Harrison is, upon constitutional grounds, opposed to a national bank; and that if, as President of the United States, he should yield his own scruples, and approve an act to charter one, it would be from the actual necessities of the Treasury, in relation to the receipt and disbursement of the public revenue, and the unequivocal manifestations of public opinion in its favor. Thus occupying precisely Mr. Madison's ground when he signed the charter of the late bank. Mr. Van Buren is, professedly, uncompromising in his opposition to a national bank, but he favors an executive machinery which is nothing more nor less than a bank, and infinitely more to be dreaded than a joint-stock bank chartered by Congress, and any that General Harrison could be brought to approve. Misled by the public prints of the day, I certainly did General Harrison great injustice in charging him, in as round terms as I did in 1836, with being favorable to a national bank, and I cheerfully retract it. In yielding his approbation under any circumstances to an act incorporating a national bank, General Harrison would do more than I would, yet his opinions are opposed to the system, and his influence would be directed against it.

Fellow-citizens, I find the recorded votes of many who stand high in the confidence of all republicans, who not only asserted the constitutional power of Congress to charter a national bank, but voted for the bill chartering the late bank. Among the number are Mr. Forsyth, the Secretary of State, Mr. Cuthbert, and Mr. Lumpkin, now Senators from Georgia. Mr. Crawford was its decided advocate—General Harrison never was. This objection, then, cannot avail.

The fifth objection is that General Harrison is an ABOLITIONIST, in the modern sense of this term.

Within the last five years, the subject of what is called "modern abolition" has caused, very justly, an anxious inquiry into the powers of the Federal Government over the slave property held in the Southern section of the confederacy. Of all the topics that have been made the subject of approval or condemnation of the Presidential candidates, by the friends and opponents of either, there is no one in which the party opposed to General Harrison have more grossly misrepresented his principles than on this. Feeling in common with every other citizen of the South, a desire to know the opinions of the two candidates now before the people on this subject, I have endeavored to trace them through their public career, and from their votes and conduct heretofore, if possible, ascertain what they have in former times thought and said, as well as what they now think and say, touching the question of abolition.

Whilst I freely concede to every one the right to entertain his own opinions regarding the original institution of slavery; I consider it a question of very different import, what may be the principles of a public man on the subject of the constitutional powers of the Federal Government over the existing relations of master and slave in

the United States. The first relates to the original organization of the social and political systems; the last touches the powers of the Government over the citizen, under a system already established, which system, every motive of patriotism combines with the superadded obligations of an oath, to oblige every citizen to maintain, not as he might wish it to have been formed at first, but as it *was* made and transmitted to us by our revolutionary fathers.

The first occasion, I believe, which presented prominently this question, was on the admission of Missouri into the Union. It is well known that the territory comprehended within Missouri, was ceded to the United States by a foreign Power, by treaty, which contained a stipulation requiring the inhabitants of the ceded territory, to be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States. The inhabitants of Missouri held slaves as property, and when she sought admission into the Union, the right to become a member of the confederacy was by some denied her, unless she should provide by the Constitution, for the abolition of slavery within the limits of the proposed State.

On the 16th of February, 1819, General Harrison was a member of Congress, from the Cincinnati district, in the State of Ohio, a *non-slaveholding State*, and on that day, it will appear by the journals of Congress, the vote was taken on the law imposing restrictions on the admission of Missouri into the Union. The first clause of these restrictions prohibited the further introduction of slaves into Missouri: General Harrison recorded his vote against this restriction. The second clause provided for the emancipation of all slaves at the age of twenty-five years, born within said State: General Harrison recorded his vote *against* this also. Two days after this he voted *against* a clause prohibiting the future introduction of slavery into Arkansas, and *against* the future emancipation of slaves born in Arkansas. Here we find General Harrison, in 1819, standing side by side with the Southern portion of the Union, in opposition, let it not be forgotten, to every one of his then colleagues from the State of Ohio, holding and upholding, by his vote, those principles for which Virginia and the whole South then and now contend. To estimate fully the value of such a course, and the true character of the man, we should bear in mind the time and occasion referred to. When these votes were given, General Harrison, in common with every other observing man, knew that he was sacrificing temporary popularity to his convictions of duty. He saw, as did every other enlightened statesman of that day, in the question then pending, the elements of a tempest, the first gale of which then rocked the Union to its base, and which now, with accumulated fury, threatens to dash the fabric of the Union to atoms. His patriotism did not stop to calculate the chances of gaining votes and winning "golden opinions;" he thought only for his country, and acted, fearless of consequences, in the way to save her. What, now let us ask, did Mr. Van Buren in this crisis? In the year 1820, the Missouri question was still pending and unsettled. Public opinion, from all quarters of the Union, was roused into painful activity, and brought to bear upon Congress in every possible shape. The most obvious and effective of the modes adopted, by the States, to influence the decision of Congress, was that of legislative instruction of Senators, and request of Representatives, to vote for or against the Missouri restrictions, as the opinions of the States might happen to be. Mr. Van Buren, in the year 1820, was a member of the State Senate of New York, and in that year, the following preamble and resolution came up in that body for adoption:

"Whereas the inhibiting the further extension of slavery in these United States is a subject of deep concern to the people of this State; and whereas *we consider slavery as an evil much to be deplored, and that every constitutional barrier should be interposed to prevent its further extension*; and that the Constitution of the United States clearly gives Congress the right to require of new States, not comprehended within the original boundaries of the United States, the prohibiting of slavery as a condition of their admission into the Union: Therefore,

Resolved, That our Senators be instructed, and our Representatives in Congress be requested, to oppose the admission, *as a State*, into the Union, of any Territory not comprised as aforesaid, *making the prohibition of slavery therein an indispensable condition of admission.*"

"On the 29th of January, 1820, the Senate (of New York) took up the resolution and passed the same *unanimously*, the following Senators being present: Messrs. Adams, Austin, Barnum, Barton, Brown, Childs, Dudley, Dayton, Dittens, Evans, Forthington, Hammond, Hart, Livingston, Lundsberry, McMortin, Moors, Mallary, Moore, Noyes, Payne, Ross, Rozencrantz, Skinner, Swan, VAN BUREN, Wilson, Young—29."

Here we have the recorded evidence of Mr. Van Buren's opinion on this subject, in 1820, and his vote as given above. Was he then with the South? No; he voted for a resolution affirming that "*slavery was an evil greatly to be deplored,*" and "*that every constitutional barrier should be interposed to prevent its extension;*" and asserts, then, that one *constitutional* method of checking the extension of slavery, is, to admit no new State into the Union, unless upon the condition that the people of such new State shall give up the right to their slaves. And he votes instructions to the then Senator from New York according to these views. Thus, it appears that, while at this momentous crisis, General Harrison was in Congress braving the fury of the storm, guarding by his vote the rights of the South, Mr. Van Buren (now put forward as the exclusive guardian of Southern rights) was, by his vote and expressed opinions, contributing all in his power to the elements of disunion, which were connected with the subject, and *instructing* his Senators to give votes directly opposed to the principles *then* and *now* held by the South, and, strange to say, directly opposed to the principles which he himself now *professes* to be his own, and the true constitutional rule on the subject. *Then*, when his aims had not yet reached to grasp Southern votes, he had *one set of principles*. Now, when Southern votes are wanted to seat him in federal power, he *professes another and directly opposite set of principles*.— Thus we have a clue to that expressive description of Mr. Van Buren's principles as a politician. He is, by his partial friends, said to be "a Northern man with Southern principles." If recorded history be not false and untrue, a definition more aptly descriptive of him would be, "a Northern man *without* principles!"

Passing from the period of the Missouri controversy, let us see what are the principles of General Harrison now on the question of abolition. To put the subject in a light not to be misunderstood or misrepresented, I here subjoin a full and clear statement of General Harrison's views touching this question, as delivered by himself in a speech to the people of Vincennes, in the State of Indiana, as late as 1835. That portion of his address which relates to this subject is given; by which it will be seen that he then, as now, a candidate for the Presidency, speaking to the people of a non-slaveholding State, did not hesitate to convey to them and the world opinions which it may be fairly supposed were not likely to be well received by those to whom they were immediately addressed:

Extracts from General Harrison's speech at Vincennes, Indiana, July 4th, 1835.

"I have now, fellow-citizens, a few words more to say on another subject, and which is, in my opinion, of more importance than any other that is now in the course of discussion in any part of the Union. I allude to the societies which have been formed, and the movements of certain individuals, in some of the States, in relation to a portion of the population in others. The conduct of these persons is the more dangerous, because their object is masked under the garb of disinterestedness and benevolence; and their course vindicated by arguments and propositions which in the abstract no one can deny. But, however fascinating may be the dress with which their schemes are presented to their fellow-citizens, with whatever purity of intention they may have been formed and sustained, they will be found to carry in their train mischief to the whole Union, and horrors to a large portion of it, which it is probable some of the projectors and many of their supporters have never thought of; the latter, the first in the series of evils which are to spring from this source, are such as you have read of, to have been perpetrated on the fair plains of Italy and Gaul by the Scythian hordes of Attila and Alaric; and such, as most of you apprehended upon that memorable night, when the tomahawks and war clubs of the followers of Tecumseh were rattling in your suburbs. I regard not the disavowals of any such intention upon the part of the authors of these schemes, since, upon the examination of the publications which have been made, they will be found to contain the very fact and every argument which would have been used if such had been their objects. I am certain that there is not in this assembly one of these deluded men, and that there are few within the bounds of the State. If there are any, I would earnestly entreat them to forbear, to pause in their career, and deliberately consider the consequences of their conduct to the whole Union, to the States more immediately interested, and to those for whose benefit they profess to act. That the latter will be the victims of the weak, injudicious, presumptuous, and unconstitutional efforts to serve them, a thorough examination of the subject must convince them. The struggle (and struggle there must be) may commence with horrors such as I have described, but it will end with more firmly riveting the chains, or in the utter extirpation of those whose cause they advocate. Am I wrong,

fellow-citizens, in applying the terms weak, presumptuous, and unconstitutional, to the measures of the emancipators? A slight examination will, I think, show that I am not. In a vindication of the objects of a convention which was lately held in one of the towns of Ohio, which I saw in a newspaper, it was said that nothing more was intended than to produce a state of public feeling which would lead to an amendment of the constitution, authorizing the abolition of slavery in the United States. Now, can an amendment to the constitution be effected without the consent of the Southern States? What, then, is the proposition to be submitted to them? It is this: The present provisions of the constitution secure to you the right (a right which you held before it was made, and which you have never given up) to manage your domestic concerns in your own way; but as we are convinced that you do not manage them properly, we want you to put in the hands of the General Government, in the councils of which we have the majority, the control over these matters, the effect of which will be virtually to transfer the power from yours into our hands. Again, in some of the States, and in sections of others, the black population far exceeds that of the white. Some of the emancipators propose an immediate abolition. What is the proposition then as it regards those States and parts of States, but the alternatives of amalgamation with the blacks, or an exchange of situations with them? Is there any man of common sense who does not believe that the emancipated blacks, being a majority, will not insist upon a full participation of political rights with the whites, and, when possessed of these, that they will not contend for a full share of social rights also? What but the extremity of weakness and folly could induce any one to think that such propositions as these could be listened to by a people so intelligent as those of the Southern States? Further, the emancipators generally declare that it is their intention to effect their object (although their acts contradict the assertion by no other means than by convincing the slaveholders that the immediate emancipation of the slaves is called for both by moral obligation and sound policy. An unfledged youth at the moment of his leaving (indeed in some instances before he has left it) his Theological Seminary, undertakes to give lectures upon morals to the countrymen of Wythe, Tucker, Pendleton, and Lowndes, and lessons of political wisdom to States whose affairs have so recently been directed by Jefferson and Madison, Macon and Crawford. Is it possible that instances of greater vanity and presumption could be exhibited?

“But the course pursued by the emancipators is unconstitutional. I do not say that there are any words in the constitution which forbid such discussions as they say they are engaged in. I know that there are not. And there is even an article which secures to the citizens the right to express and publish their opinions without restriction. But in the construction of the constitution it is always necessary to refer to the circumstances under which it was framed, and to ascertain its meaning by a comparison of its provisions with each other, and with the previous situation of the several States who were parties to it. In a portion of these slavery was recognised, and they took care to have the right secured to them to follow and reclaim such of them as were fugitives to other States. The laws of Congress passed under this power have provided punishment to any who shall oppose or interrupt the exercise of this right.— Now, can any one believe that the instrument which contains a provision of this kind, which authorizes a master to pursue his slave into another State, take him back, and provides a punishment for any citizen or citizens of that State who should oppose him, should at the same time authorize the latter to assemble together, to pass resolutions and adopt addresses, not only to encourage the slaves to leave their masters, but to cut their throats before they do so? I insist that, if the citizens of the non-slaveholding States can avail themselves of the article of the constitution which prohibits the restriction of speech or the press, to publish any thing injurious to the rights of the slaveholding States, they can go to the extreme that I have mentioned, and effect any thing further which writing or speaking could effect. But, fellow-citizens, these are not the principles of the constitution. Such a construction would defeat one of the great objects of its formation, which was that of securing the peace and harmony of the States which were parties to it. The liberty of speech and of the press were given as the most effectual means to preserve to each and every citizen their own rights, and to the States the rights which appertained to them at the time of its adoption.

“It could never have been expected that it would be used by the citizens of one portion of the States for the purpose of depriving those of another portion of the rights, which they had reserved at the adoption of the constitution, and in the exercise of which none but themselves have any concern or interest. If slavery is an evil, (and no one more

readily acknowledges it than I do,) the evil is with them. If there is guilt in it, the guilt is theirs, not ours, since neither the States where it does not exist, nor the Government of the United States, can, without usurpation of power, and the violation of a solemn compact, do any thing to remove it, without the consent of those who are immediately interested. With that consent there is not a man in the whole world who would more willingly contribute his aid to accomplish it than I would. If my vote could effect it, every surplus dollar in the Treasury should be appropriated to that object. But they will neither ask for aid nor consent to be aided, so long as the illegal, persecuting, and dangerous movements are in progress of which I complain; the interest of all concerned requires that these should be immediately stopped. This can only be done by the force of public opinion, and that cannot too soon be brought into operation. Every movement which is made by the abolitionists in the non-slaveholding States is viewed by our Southern brethren as an attack upon their rights, and which, if persisted in, must in the end, eradicate those feelings of attachment and affection between the citizens of all the States which were produced by a community of interests and dangers in the war of the Revolution, which was the foundation of our happy Union, and by a continuance of which it alone can be preserved. I entreat you then, fellow citizens, to frown upon the measures which are to produce results, so much to be deprecated. The opinions which I have now given, I have omitted no opportunity for the last two years to lay before the people of my own State. I have taken the liberty to express them here, knowing that even if they should unfortunately not accord with yours, they would be kindly received."

With these proofs of uniform adherence to anti-abolition views, by General Harrison, running through a period of twenty years, I should dismiss the subject, but that I feel impelled by a sense of duty, to expose the low artifices lately employed to mislead public sentiment, by garbled extracts of letters, which are, however put forth with every appearance of giving an entire statement. It is amongst the melancholy omens with which the times abound, that the statements of the public press have ceased to carry with them, in public estimation, the evidence of truth. As an instance of this kind, I give below what *purports* to be a letter of General Harrison, *in full*, addressed to the people. As it is published by his enemies it stands thus :

"TO THE PUBLIC.

FELLOW CITIZENS: Being suddenly called home, to attend to my sick family, I have but a moment to answer a few of the calumnies which are in circulation against me.

"I am accused of being friendly to slavery. From my earliest youth up to the present moment, I have been the ardent friend of human liberty. At the age of 18, I became a member of an abolition society, established at Richmond, the object of which was to ameliorate the condition of slaves, and procure their freedom by every legal means. My venerable friend Judge Gatch, of Clermont County, was also a member of this society, and has lately given me a certificate that I was one. The obligations I came under I have faithfully performed.

"WM. HENRY HARRISON."

In a recent publication, addressed to the people of Virginia, the above appears, and is there stated to be taken from a paper published in Cincinnati, on the 14th of February last. A plain, honest inquirer, searching for truth, and reading the above, would naturally suppose that it was, 1st, a letter written in February last; 2ndly, that it was an entire letter; and, 3rdly, as a consequence from its contents, he would conclude, that it was expressly written by General Harrison, to show that he was an abolitionist of the modern school. Such undoubtedly is the impression which the publication referred to is intended to produce. But what is our surprise when we learn, first, that the letter was not written in February 1840, but in 1822; 2ndly, that it is not an entire letter, but only two short paragraphs of a long letter, the whole remainder of which is carefully suppressed; and, 3dly, that it was written for the purpose of defending himself against the votes, I have quoted, given on the Missouri question, and that the part suppressed, contains a complete and full avowal of the principles of those votes, he being then (1822,) a candidate again for Congress, and Mr. Gazley, who, as we shall see was elected as an abolitionist, being his opponent. Here follows the entire letter as it was then published :

"TO THE PUBLIC.

"FELLOW CITIZENS: Being called suddenly home, to attend my sick family, I have but a moment to answer a few of the calumnies which are in circulation concerning me.

"I am accused of being friendly to slavery. From my earliest youth to the present moment, I have been the *ardent friend of human liberty*. At the age of 18, I became a member of an *abolition society*, established at Richmond, Virginia; the object of which was to ameliorate the condition of slaves, and *procure their freedom by every legal means*. My venerable friend Judge Gatch, of Clermont county, was also a member of that Society, and has lately given me a certificate that I was one. *The obligations which I then came under I have faithfully performed*. I have been the means of liberating many slaves but *never placed one in bondage*. I deny that my votes in Congress, in relation to Missouri and Arkansas, are in the least incompatible with these principles. Congress had no more legal or constitutional right to emancipate the negroes in those sections of Louisiana, without the consent of their owners, than they have to free those of Kentucky. These people were secured in their property by a solemn covenant with France, when the country was purchased from that Power. To prohibit the emigration of citizens of the Southern States, to the part of the country, the situation and climate of which was peculiarly suited to them, would have been highly unjust, as it had been purchased out of the common fund; particularly, too, when it is rec llected that all the immense territory to the Northwest of the Ohio had been ceded by Virginia, and that, with an unexampled liberality, she had herself proposed by excluding slavery from it, to secure it for the emigration of those States which had no slaves. Was it proper, then, when her reserved territory, was in a great measure filled up, to exclude her citizens from every part of the territory purchased out of the common fund? *I was the first person to introduce into Congress the proposition that all the country above Missouri*, (which, having no inhabitants, was free from the objection made to Missouri and Arkansas,) *should never have slavery admitted into it*. I repeat what I have before said, that as our Union was only effected by mutual concession, so only can it be preserved.

"My vote against the restriction of Missouri, in forming her Constitution was not a conclusive one. There would have been time enough, had I continued to be a member, before the question was decided, for my constituents to have instructed me; and I should have rejoiced in any opportunity of sacrificing my seat to my principles, if they had instructed me in opposition to my construction of the Constitution. Like many other members from non-slaveholding States, among whom I mention Shaw, Holmes, Mason of Massachusetts, Lanman of Connecticut, and Baldwin of Pennsylvania, I could see nothing in the constitution which I had sworn to support, to warrant such an interference with the rights of the States, and which had never before been attempted? And where is the crime in one set of men not being able to interpret the constitution as other men interpret it? As we had all *sworn* to support it, the crime would have been in giving it a construction which our consciences would not sanction. And let me ask, for what good is this question again brought up? It has been settled, as all our family differences have been settled, on the firm basis of mutual compromise. And patriotism, as well as prudence, devoted the effects of that *awful discussion* to eternal oblivion. Is it not known that, from that cause, the great fabric of our Union was shaken to its foundation? Is it not known that Missouri would not have submitted to the restriction and that the other slave-holding States had determined to support her? But for this compromise, the probability is, that at this moment we might look on the opposite shore of Ohio, not for an affectionate sister State, but an armed and implacable rival. What patriotic man would not join the gallant *Eaton*, in execrating the *head and the hand*, that could devise and execute a scheme productive of a calumny so awful?

"Upon the whole, fellow citizens, our path is a plain one: it is that marked out as well by humanity as duty. We cannot emancipate the slaves of the other States without their consent, but by producing a convulsion which would undo us all. For this much to be desired event, we must wait the slow but certain progress of these good principles which are every where gaining ground, and which assuredly will ultimately prevail."

* * * * *

"WM. HENRY HARRISON."

Thus, fellow citizens, you will see that, either through ignorance or by design, those who profess a wish to open your eyes to the light, have concealed from you the truth, and, although guilty of no positive assertion of falsehood, have, either through ignorance or design, suppressed the truth; which last, from whatever cause, is equally fatal to your right understanding of the questions you have to determine.

I have greatly misunderstood the proud magnanimity of Virginians, if this course, obviously calculated to deceive them, and misrepresent one of their own sons, does not create in their very hearts a swelling fountain of that very sympathy which it was in-

tended to destroy. To show how nobly General Harrison, in 1822, sacrificed his seat in Congress to his and to your principles, I subjoin the following statement from the National Intelligencer, of October 20, 1822,

"It is confirmed to us that Mr. Gazley is elected in opposition to General Harrison. *A friend informs us, which we are sorry to learn, that he was opposed particularly on account of his adherence to that principle of the Constitution, which secures to the people of the South their pre-existing rights.*"

I here dismiss the subject, satisfied that neither calumny nor ignorance, can misrepresent or be deceived as to the opinions of General Harrison on this question.

So far then, fellow-citizens, as objections are concerned, the political opinions of Gen. Harrison are not more obnoxious than those of Mr. Van Buren, which leave them both precisely upon the same ground. The next inquiry is, in what are General Harrison's opinions preferable to those of Mr. Van Buren? I answer by quoting from a letter addressed by General Harrison to Harmer Denny, on the 2d of December, 1838, the following opinions upon the great question of Executive power, patronage, and influence, which constitutes the great issue between the Administration and its opponents. He says:

"Among the principles properly to be adopted by any Executive sincerely desirous to restore the Administration to its original *simplicity* and *purity*, I deem the following to be of prominent importance:

"1. TO CONFINE HIS SERVICE TO A SINGLE TERM."

Is there any republican who can doubt the great value to our institutions and safety to our liberty which would result from the establishment of such a precedent. It was a favorite principle with all our republican Presidents, and every friend of liberty should rejoice at seeing the example set.

"2. TO DISCLAIM ALL RIGHT OF CONTROL OVER THE PUBLIC TREASURE with the exception of such part of it as may be appropriated by law to carry on the public service, and that to be applied precisely as the law may direct, and drawn from the Treasury agreeable to the long established forms of the Department."

Can any conservative republican fail to perceive that this article contains the very gist of the contest between him and the Administration, and that General Harrison's opinions are in strict accordance with his own? Would not this loosening of the hold of the Executive upon the public Treasury be an invaluable gain?

"3. THAT HE SHOULD NEVER ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE THE ELECTIONS, either by the people or the State Legislatures, nor suffer the federal officers under his control to take any other part in them than by giving their own votes when they possess the right of voting."

Would not this be an important achievement to the purity of the elective franchise, and the efficiency of popular elections? Would it not save the contaminating influence of official interference with the exercise of the most valuable and important right of American freemen? Surely it would, if the opinions of your Jeffersons, your Madisons, your Taylors, and a host of most eminent and sagacious republican statesmen are to be relied upon. If you wish to learn its value, go to the city of New York on an election day, and witness with your own eyes *five hundred* office-holders, receiving salaries of upwards of \$500,000, collecting and disbursing millions of the public revenue, busily engaged in controlling and directing public opinion; and that, too, by means not the most honorable.

"4. That, in the exercise of the veto power, he should limit his rejection of bills to—1st. Such as are in his opinion unconstitutional. 2d. Such as tend to encroach on the rights of States or individuals. 3d. Such as involving deep interest, may, in his opinion, require more mature deliberation or reference to the will of the people, to be ascertained at the succeeding elections."

This is a brief but most clear and comprehensive exposition of the design and office of the veto power, and is in strict accordance with Mr. Jefferson's views. It manifests that respect for the legislation of Congress which every Executive ought to maintain towards the representative body. It would elevate the legislature to its true dignity, and preserve its independence.

"5. That he should never suffer the influence of his name to be used for purposes of a purely party character.

The magnanimity and value of this sentiment is above all praise, and should be engraved in enduring letters upon the heart of every freeman. How much would it do to heal the angry dissensions which now agitate and divide the country, restore tranquility to an excited people, and introduce that system of wise and discreet legislation so necessary to our welfare? It is the sentiment of a truly patriotic heart, and one which should inscribe the name of its author on the brightest page of the history of public benefaction.

"6. That in removals from office of those who hold their appointments during the pleasure of the Executive, the cause of such removal should be stated, if requested, to the Senate, at the time the nomination of a successor is made."

And last, but not least in importance :

"That he should not suffer the Executive department of the Government to become the source of legislation, but leave the whole business of making laws for the Union to the department to which the Constitution has exclusively assigned it, until they have assumed that perfect shape where and when alone the opinions of the Executive may be heard."

This is a very clear and correct view of the powers and duties of the Executive department, and the manner in which it should be administered, and presents a striking contrast to Mr. Van Buren's bold pretension, that the Executive is a *component* part of the Legislative department.

To him who has deeply and maturely studied the principles upon which our system was formed, the very labored and cautious adjustment of power between the three great departments of the Government, I may confidently appeal, and inquire whether the principles contained in the preceding articles, are not wise, and judicious, and most emphatically republican? The tremendous power, immense patronage, and overwhelming influence which the Executive has already acquired, and the great additions which are now most assiduously and perseveringly sought to be made to them, is arousing the jealousy, exciting the fears, and prompting the resistance of the great mass of our citizens to check and reduce them. In such a struggle these principles are *all in all*, and are of infinitely more value, if possible, than in ordinary times. In addition to these sterling principles of republicanism, General Harrison, in his letter to Sherrod Williams, avowed his wish to see every experiment made for the successful management of the finances of the nation, before resorting to a national bank. Being against a national bank, and against a Sub-treasury, the only experiment which he could make, would be to give the State banks a fair trial. If they succeed, then all will be satisfied—if not, then some other measure must be resorted to. Is not this the very ground upon which the Conservatives have planted themselves; and would they not in the election of General Harrison, achieve the very principles upon which they abandoned this Administration? Most clearly they would. And will they barter away these great advantages—these valuable principles, for some mere abstractional differences between them and General Harrison? I trust they will act more wisely. But, above all, will we not signally defeat the Sub-treasury *scheme*, with all its appendant schemes of Executive power and aggrandizement—its system of proscription and discipline—enough, of themselves, to immortalize the event in the eyes of the world and posterity?

In enumerating the reasons why I have abandoned Mr. Van Buren, and the party which "supports him," I have said nothing about its utter disregard of the cautious provisions of the Constitution, and violation of the laws, perpetrated by the House of Representatives, in refusing to permit five of the Representatives from New Jersey, who had as high authority as any member upon the floor, whatever may have been the true state of the election, to take their seats; nor to that system of party proscription which wars upon representative independence, and appropriates the emoluments of office, as the "*spoils*" of *party victory*; or of that discipline which binds the great mass to the lead of a few captains of party. These principles and practices have been so often and so fully discussed, and their mischiefs so forcibly pointed out, that I need make no remark about them, only that they are fit instruments of faction, and Executive ambition; nor have I stopped to inquire how the "extreme" of the "proclamation," and "nullification," have found a common rallying ground on the Sub-treasury system. It is enough for me to know, that there is not a sufficiency of

republicanism in either to command my support, and I regard the rallying ground more anti-republican and dangerous than either or both combined.

To repel calumny and unjust criticism upon the courage, capacity, and military skill of Gen Harrison, I propose to take a short view of "HIS LIFE, CHARACTER, AND PUBLIC SERVICES."

The character, life, and public services of General Harrison, whether as a citizen, a statesman, or a soldier, are such as every American, and more especially every Virginian, who studies and reflects on the history of his country, with common candor, cannot fail to contemplate with pride and pleasure.

Born and brought up in Virginia, the son of one of her most honored patriots of the Revolution, William Henry Harrison entered the service of the United States at an early age, under the auspices and friendship of General Washington. He repaired, at one of the darkest periods of our annals, to the Northwest, to fight the battles of the nation, as an officer of infantry, under the veteran Wayne, against the numerous and powerful bands of hostile Indians who had already defeated Harmar and St. Clair. In that campaign he early attracted the attention of General Wayne, and became one of his aids; as such, he took an active and efficient part in the arduous duties of a frontier service against the Indians; received the repeated public commendation of Wayne for his merits, as well in minor affairs as in the great victory which broke the power of the Indians, ended the campaign, and produced the peace of Greenville. He was then appointed Secretary of the Northwest Territory, in which office his signal ability commended him to the respect and esteem of the people; and he became their Delegate in the House of Representatives of the United States. Here, young as he was, and among men of the highest talents, he eminently distinguished himself during the short period he then remained in the House, by originating and carrying through a law of the most important character, to wit: the sale of the public lands in small lots, instead of the old system of disposing of them only in large tracts to speculators; a measure, which, right as it was in itself, and useful to the Government and the country, was, above all, to be honored and applauded as an act of equal justice to the actual settler, to the poor man, to the many, to all who wish to clear and cultivate the land for themselves; and which, therefore, had a permanent influence over the prosperity of the West. After this he became Governor of the Territory of Indiana, and so continued until, in 1812, the war with Great Britain called him into a wider sphere of usefulness and fame, as commander of the Northwestern army. Whilst Governor of Indiana, he exhibited equal capacity alike for the highest civil and military functions. In the former he discharged, most ably and faithfully, all the complicated and numerous administrative duties of his office of Governor, for a long series of years; in addition to which, as Superintendent of Indian Affairs on that extensive frontier, he not only controlled the Indians, and preserved the public peace, in promoting the welfare of the whites and savages both, but negotiated many most important treaties, to the perfect satisfaction of the successive Presidents of the United States, under whose instructions he acted. In the latter, when the approach of the war with Great Britain seduced the Indians into hostilities, he conducted an expedition against the combined tribes banded together by Tecumseh and the Prophet, and gained the celebrated victory of Tippecanoe, by means of the union of the qualities of courage, prudence, and generalship, which he had acquired and practised under the banners of Anthony Wayne. When at length the war of 1812 broke out, the spontaneous confidence of the West was turned upon him, as the man to lead their patriotic armies to the field, to guard and protect the Northwest, to repair the disgrace of Hull's surrender, and to chastise the allied British and Indians on the lakes and in Upper Canada.— Surrounded as he was by innumerable difficulties in this great enterprise, he yet nobly succeeded, by the aid of the brave militia and volunteers of Kentucky, Ohio, and the other States, in repelling the invaders from our soil, sustaining the gallant defence of Fort Meigs, and at length pursuing the enemy into Upper Canada, and there gaining the brilliant and ever memorable victory of the Thames; recovering Detroit; and concluding the war in the Northwest and in Upper Canada. Being returned to Congress after the war, first as a member of the House of Representatives, and afterwards of the Senate, he there displayed, in his votes, speeches, and legislative measures, the high traits of statesmanship, patriotism, and eloquence, which distinguished him in his whole career. Finally, as envoy of the United States to the Republic of Colombia, he finished (for the time being) his diversified services to the Union, to be now soon recalled, as I devoutly hope and trust, to the highest station which it is in the power of the people of the United States to bestow.

I do not propose, on the present occasion—I have neither space nor time—to enter into a particular review of the eventful life of General Harrison, nor to examine minutely all the details of his public services, his opinions, and his qualifications for the Presidency. I entreat you to do this for yourselves, as I have done it; and I have entire confidence that the result will satisfy you that his experience of affairs, his eminence alike in camp and council, his tried patriotism, his unblemished integrity, his republican sentiments, his truly American character and life, point him out as the man of the crisis, who is to redeem the country from its sufferings and to reform the public abuses under which the Government labors.

That, distinguished as he is, and selected as the candidate of the people for the great trust of Chief Magistrate of the Union, he should be assailed by the instruments of the party in power, and his reputation slandered, was to be expected, how much soever it may be the subject of regret to every candid and impartial mind. But the character of General Harrison is not one which detraction can attempt to blacken with any possibility of success. His fame is part and parcel of the fame of his country. His name is identified with the great deeds, and interwoven into the web of the mighty events, which do honor to the nation; and it cannot be struck out without destroying the very fabric of the national honor itself.

Men who never saw a foughten field have presumed to impeach his courage and generalship; and mere politicians have presumed to depreciate the statesmanship of the worthy compeer of the Jeffersons and Madisons, those bright ornaments of Virginia and of America. To impeach the courage of General Harrison! Is it not the very climax of absurdity, the last resort of desperate party phrenzy, to call in question the bravery of one of the best blood of Virginia's fertile growth of brave hearts? Is the race of Virginia's sons to be thus accused? Is not only all history of the country to be falsified, but the fame of an ancient Commonwealth, and the proverbial character of her children, to be systematically degraded to carry out this party warfare in favor of the falling cause of Mr. Van Buren? And against whose person? Why against that of the son of Governor Benjamin Harrison; the protege of General Washington; the pupil in the art of war of Anthony Wayne; the man whose whole life, from boyhood up, was passed amid all the hazards of war, or of frontier exposure and adventure among the savages of the Northwest! The man who abandoned in his youth all the ease and comforts of a professional career, to fight the battles of his country, under the leadership, and as the right hand, of one of the most daring of the generals of the Revolution, and who played his part in those perilous scenes as became the blood of Virginia. The man who, for twenty years, lived in the heart of numerous Indian tribes, to whom he taught respect for the United States by his impartial justice, and whom he compelled to respect himself by his fearlessness, fortitude, and spirit. The man who withstood and defeated all the intrigues of the wily Tecumseh; who vanquished the bands of the Prophet at Tippecanoe; who led the brave men of the West against the armies of Britain, through innumerable dangers and hardships, in all which he partook with the commonest soldier of his camp; and who consummated the whole by capturing the army of Proctor, on the banks of the Thames. To impeach the courage of such a man—of one whose life has been such as this, would be absurd and ridiculous, at best; but it is monstrous thus to seek, in the bitterness of party rancor, to belittle the character of Virginia and of America, by vain assaults and manufactured imputations on the character of one of their noblest sons.

Did not the gallant Kentuckians know what bravery was? what military prowess was? Were they the men to flock to the standard of Harrison, to demand, to require him of the Government, as their leader to battle? and yet he the man to win, to receive, and to retain their devoted respect and attachment through so many battles and victories of the Northwest—he to be now made the object of such miserable detraction?

And the generalship of William Henry Harrison, that also is to be called in question at this late day. It is quite easy to cavil at the arrangements of a campaign, and the evolutions of a field of battle. Any carpet-night can do that. There never was a campaign conducted, never a battle fought, however successful in the results, that somebody, in the blindness of over-wisdom, might not be found to criticise.

“Nor might nor greatness in mortality
Can censure'sscape: back-wounding calumny
The loftiest virtue strikee.”

But the common-sense of the world tells us that VICTORY is the best proof the generalship which produces it. *That* cannot be cavilled away. There is the hill-side battle-field of Tippecanoe, with its bright laurels yet fresh in the memories of the living generation, to speak to the honor of the conqueror; there is the ground of Camp Meigs, to commemorate the fame of its brave defender; there is the plain of the Moravian Towns, in the heart of Upper Canada, to testify in all future time to the glory of the commander, who redeemed, in the battle of the Thames, the honor of the American standard, by the capture of the British army, the final defeat and dispersion of the Indians, and the complete pacification of the Northwest. In a word, to endeavor, at this day, to rail off the seal of honor from the name of that general who, it was well said by the present Vice President of the United States, was, during the late war, longer in active service than any other, was perhaps oftener in action than any other, and who never sustained a defeat—to try to depreciate him is, like the envious viper of the fable, to expend the venom in gnawing at a file.

In this brief address, I cannot, as I have already said, go over the discussion of the details of the military events of General Harrison's life. Nor is it necessary. The people of the United States have, through the unanimous voice of Congress, and after full discussion, and a hearing of all the petty cavils that are now raked up against General Harrison's campaigns out of the moldered ashes of the extinguished calumnies of the past—the American people, I say, have tried, passed judgment upon, and settled the matter. On the 30th of March, 1818, the two Houses of Congress adopted, without a division, the following resolution, which was approved by President Monroe, on the 4th of April, and is to be found in the published volumes of the acts of Congress, namely:

Resolution directing medals to be struck, and, together with the thanks of Congress, presented to Major General Harrison and Governor Shelby, and for other purposes.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the thanks of Congress be, and they are hereby, presented to Major General William Henry Harrison and Isaac Shelby, late Governor of Kentucky, and through them, to the officers and men under their command, for their gallantry and good conduct in defeating the combined British and Indian forces under Major General Proctor, on the Thames, in Upper Canada, on the fifth of October, one thousand eight hundred and thirteen, capturing the British army, with their baggage, camp equipage, and artillery; and that the President of the United States be requested to cause two gold medals to be struck, emblematical of his triumph, and presented to General Harrison and Isaac Shelby, late Governor of Kentucky.

H. CLAY,

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

JOHN GALLARD,

President of the Senate, pro tem.

JAMES MONROE.

April 4, 1818.—Approved:

This, I repeat, is the *final judgment* of Congress, and of the nation upon the whole matter. It is as idle and uncandid to undertake to impeach this judgment now, by one-sided publications of the facts or discussions that preceded the judgment, as it would be to rip up the one-sided evidence of any other judgment of the tribunal which had tried and settled a cause before it.

Nor, if this were a thing just and fair to be done, is there any thing in those facts or discussions, otherwise than in the highest degree honorable to General Harrison. When it was proposed to bestow on him and his gallant army, the well-earned thanks of the nation, he was made the object of envious and groundless charges in the Senate; as who that is a conspicuous mark, and whose life is an eventful one, may not be accused? The action of the Senate was suspended to investigate those charges? They were investigated. And we have the unanimous vote of thanks, of Congress, to prove that the charges were false; we have the unanimous report of a committee of the House of Representatives, of which Richard M. Johnson was chairman, to prove that what of charge was committed to them to examine was utterly false; and that General Harrison, *in his whole conduct as commander*, was "governed by a laudable zeal for, and devotion to, the public service;" we have the unanimous vote of the House upon that report to affirm and perpetuate its effect; we have the speeches of Mahlon Dickerson of New Jersey, of James Barbour of Virginia, and John W.

Hulbert of Massachusetts, to proclaim and declare, in the public presence, name, and behalf of either House of Congress, that EVERY THING, *great and small*, which had been charged or insinuated against him, in impeachment of his title to the unanimous thanks of Congress, was *utterly false*; and we have the declaration of Thomas Ritchie, made at the time, in view of the whole case, testifying in the name of public opinion and the public press, that "the envious cloud which had gathered around the head of Harrison, was now FINALLY AND FOREVER dispersed." Is there a Virginian living, so heated and blinded by party zeal, as to imagine he can reverse that judgment? Is there one so ungenerous, so uncandid, so unjust to that fame of our great men which is the common property and common good of all of us, that he would desire to reverse it? I will not believe, if there be any such, that they will receive approbation or concurrence from the generous minded spirit, which I am proud to think characterizes my native Commonwealth.

Of the statesmanship of General Harrison, as developed during his long service as Governor of Indiana Territory, and Superintendent of the Indians of the Northwest, as a Delegate in Congress from the Northwestern Territory, as a Representative in Congress from Ohio, as a Senator in Congress, I have no room to speak at length. I pray you to read his published speeches and official addresses, and to then enter into the patriotic impulses, and the enlarged wisdom, which mark the man; and I confidently believe you will conclude with me that, as well by his services in the field as in the council, he is approved to be a true disciple of Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, names of honor to Virginia, and worthy to add another to the roll of great men whom she has sent from her bosom to preside over the destinies of America.

I am well aware, fellow-citizens, that my former opposition to General Harrison, and some disparaging remarks which I have made about his capacity and fitness for the Presidency, have been, and will be again brought up in judgment against me, with a view to convict me of inconsistency. Misled by the vile slanders which were perpetrated upon General Harrison; deceived by those calumnies which floated in masses through the filthy columns of a party press, and ignorant alike of General Harrison, his true character, and his distinguished public services, I did give utterance, in the ardent zeal of strong party feeling, to sentiments, in relation to General Harrison, unjust to him, and unworthy of myself. But with the light of truth, with the recorded evidence before me, that I erred, I feel that, as a man of honor, I can do nothing less than retract what I have improperly and ignorantly said, and leave the malignant, the vindictive, and the fiery partisan to make the most of it. I am proud, fellow-citizens, that I have lived to see the day when I can do this act of justice to an injured man; and that among the cloud of missiles which malignity and envy have hurled at that distinguished patriot and statesman, the little arrow which I sped may be arrested in its flight, and fall harmless at his feet. Much more honorable is it to retract unjust imputation, than to *slander and defame* him who had been the *subject of the highest eulogy*. I utterly disregard all that has been or may be said against me on this account, and leave my accusers to revel at their pleasure in the venomous slime of their own vindictive and malignant feelings.

In the course of my political experience, fellow-citizens, I have never been able to learn the modern "sink or swim" system of opposing unwise and dangerous principles and measures, by electing to the councils of the nation their friends and advocates. I cannot, for my life, perceive how bad measures can be successfully resisted by talking against them and voting for them. This theory is so sublime, and the reasons by which it is supported so subtle, that they are beyond my comprehension. So much so, that I am impracticable to the teachings of the distinguished professor of the school of political casuistry and jugglery at Richmond, and most respectfully decline discipleship to his system.

I now, fellow-citizens, close this communication, and avow that, whatever of *weal* or *wo* may come out of it, I will oppose, with all the energy I am master of, the re-election of Martin Van Buren, and support that of William Henry Harrison. In this contest I am exercising my rights of citizenship—performing the duties of a freeman, and I shall not be deterred from their faithful execution by any denunciation which Executive wrath can pour upon me, any epithet which party intolerance can apply, any slander or defamation which a vulgar, brutal, and licentious party press can bestow. With a consciousness of the rectitude of my motives, and the justice of the cause in which I am engaged, I enter the contest boldly and fearlessly, relying upon the justice of Heaven, and the virtue and intelligence of that unterrified constituency of which I

am proud, to shield me against the arts and machinations of official proscription and party denunciation. Fellow-citizens, if am to lose your confidence, by taking the stand I have, be it so; as highly as I value your confidence, as proud as I am of it, I would prefer sacrificing that to inflicting a single pain on my own conscience, or a wound upon the liberty, the happiness, or prosperity of my country. I go for my country; he who will, may go for his party.

Your obedient servant,
J. GARLAND.

* WASHINGTON, April 18, 1840.







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